wintermute
10-03-2004, 06:56 AM
I said goodbye to Petr, not the Phora community as a whole.
I did promise Friedrich Braun that before leaving I would post the information I had gathered on Bacque and Sack. For those keeping score, this is actually my last post. I will read PMs so long as the Wintermute account is in service, so please direct all inquiries there.
The data is a overview which directly addresses the reliability of Bacque and Sack, and their support among 'reputable historians'. Also: Order JCS 1067 and it's dependance on Morgenthau, the actual circumvention of 1067 as practiced in the field, David Irving's support of Bacque, confirmation of Sack's thesis, and the absolute dishonesty, amounting to mental illness, of Fade's main source, and Bacque's chief critic, Stephen Ambrose.
Ambrose assisted Bacque in the compilation of his book, and admitted that he had nightmares after reading it and found it on the whole unbearable to think about. This makes more sense when one considers that Ambrose, a popular historian and little else, was handpicked to write Eisenhower's biography, and that Ambrose's self esteem and social status are directly tied to the Eisenhower library. Ambrose oversaw the assemblege of the book, begged off writing the introduction, and then - in an astonishing reversal - savaged the book in the New York Times, with no research against it. Rather, the review argued that 'when the research was done', Bacque would be proved wrong. Ambrose then assembled the scholars who Fade quotes.
For comparison, here is Ambrose' first take on the book: "I have now read Other Losses and wish I had not. I have had nightmares every night since I started reading... You have a sensational if appalling story and it can no longer be suppressed, and I suppose (in truth I know) it must be published... I must withdraw my offer to write a Foreword; I just can't do it to Ike. I quarrel with many of your interpretations, I am not arguing with the basic truth of your discovery.... you have the goods on these guys, you have the quotes from those who were present and saw with their own eyes, you have the broad outline of a truth so terrible that I really can't bear it... You really have made a major historical discovery, the full impact of which neither you nor I nor anyone can fully imagine.... I have written at length about your script to Alice Mayhew, my editor at Simon and Schuster."
To understand how serious Ambrose' position was, consider that he admitted to Bacque: "this thesis destroys my life's work".
The NYT, of course, had to overlook certain ethical practices to allow a collaborator in the authorship of a book review the same book, but there you have Sulzberger 'ethics' in a nutshell.
It does seem that Bacque and co. did uncover a truth so terrible that Ambrose indeed 'couldn't bear it'.
In recent years, Ambrose has been discredited as a obsessive plagarizer.
Bacque responded in Crimes and Mercies to his critics, and silenced them by the material he had recovered from the Soviet Archives. Fade is not aware of this, evidently, just as he is not aware that Sack's thesis regarding the Jewish run death camps is UNCONTROVERISAL. Even 60 minutes and the NYT have signed aboard, and one of the Commandants he ID'ed was forced to relocate to Israel, where he is currently resisting extradition in the standard Jewish way.
There is a new book out, by John Dietrich, regarding the Morgenthau plan, which also takes Bacque's case against Ambrose.
In additon to Morgenthau, there was H. Dexter White (a Jew and a Soviet agent) who was quite interested in the annhilation of Germany.
Petr also indicated he was interested in what I had dug up. Since I actually am in a rush to leave the forum, I will not assemble it into a post but rather present it as it is, with title headers for each link. Let Fade, Mugwort, Bradt, Petr, and whoever else is interested take what they wish, and have at each other.
Also, as I am a man of my word, I will not be returning to post at this forum.
I do however wish to welcome Raina to this forum for the umpteenth time, and for once feel she has found a board worthy of her talents and character. Many happy returns to her.
And now, without further delay, a core dump of Bacque related materials, with links. Enjoy,
Wintermute
JCS 1067 involves many features of the Morgenthau plan, and was implemented for two full years before substantial alteration, as it came to handicap American efforts in Germany.
http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:sdlX5mumq_8J:www.ihr.org/jhr/v09/v09p287_Kubek.html+jcs+1067+morgenthau&hl=en
How the Treasury officials were able to integrate basic features of their plan into the military directive, originally prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and known as JCS 1067, is fully disclosed in the Diaries. [B]White saw to it that many elements of his thinking were embodied in ICS 1067. Previous directives for guidance of American troops upon entrance into Germany, which already had undergone six or more revisions of a stylistic nature, were now brought more in line with the punitive thinking of Morgenthau and White. A new directive, which called for a more complete de-nazification, was, with some modifications, the spirit and substance of the Treasury plan. In the two full years that ICS 1067 was the cornerstone of American policy, Germany was punished and substantially dismantled in accord with the basic tenets of the Morgenthau Plan. JCS 1067 forbade fraternization by American personnel with the Germans, ordered a very strict program of de-nazification extending both to public life and to business, prohibited American aid in any rebuilding of German industry, and emphasized agricultural rehabilitation only.
Subsequently, JCS 1067 became a severe handicap to American efforts in Germany. It constituted what may be called without exaggeration a heavy millstone around the neck of the American military government. It gave only limited authority to to the United States military government by specifically prohibiting military officials from taking any steps to rehabilitate the German economy except to maximize agricultural production.
Details of how 1067 was undermined by in the field American commanders:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clayl.htm
MCKINZIE: It also makes it difficult, doesn't it, in matters of policy setting, because you had JCS-1067, which was as I understand it, a compromise between the War Department and the Department of State on how...
CLAY: JCS-1067 would have been extremely difficult to operate under. If you followed it literally you couldn't have done anything to restore the German economy. If you couldn't restore the German economy you could never hope to get paid for the food that they had to have. By virtue of these sort of things it was modified constantly; not officially, but by allowing this deviation and that deviation, et cetera. We began to slowly wipe out JCS-1067. When we were ordered to put in a currency reform this was in direct controvention of a provision of JCS-1067 that prohibited us from doing anything to improve the German economy. It was an unworkable policy and it wasn't changed just without any discussion or anything by those of us who were in Germany. It was done by gradual changes in its provision and changes of cablegrams, conferences, and so on.
A lengthy discussion of the Morgenthau plan from Irving. Details extensive efforts undertaken by Morgenthau and White to hoodwink Roosevelt and Churchill, and their success in same.
http://www.fpp.co.uk/bookchapters/Morgenthau.html
It was part of the price that Churchill and Cherwell were willing to pay for a broad package of American concessions over which Morgenthau had political control including further Lend-lease aid (Phase II) to the British Empire after the war; moreover Mr Churchill needed his support on military issues including joint British strategic control of the atomic bomb (the Hyde Park agreement which was signed on September 18, 1944) and Britain's participation in the war in the Pacific. We can only speculate about Harry Dexter White's purpose in canvassing a plan which would have ruined the largest country in Central Europe, the last bastion that would protect Western Europe from the Red Army in post-war years.
The memorandum endorsing the plan's objectives was initialled (Okayed) by F.D.R. and W.C. on September 15, 1944.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower had similar views. He told British ambassador Lord Halifax on July 10, 1944, that he felt the enemy leaders should be 'shot while trying to escape.' Imprisonment was not enough for the 3,500 officers of the German general staff. Lieutenant-Commander Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower's naval aide, noted in a secret diary: 'There was agreement that extermination could be left to nature if the Russians had a free hand.' Why just the Russians?, inquired Eisenhowerthey could temporarily assign zones in Germany to the smaller nations with old scores to settle.
Still, the revelation that Churchill had bankrupted Britain startled him. 'I had no idea,' he told Morgenthau. 'This is very interesting,' he sneered. 'I had no idea that England was broke. I will go over there and make a couple of talks and take over the British Empire.
. . .
On August 19, Roosevelt confidently assured Morgenthau, 'Give me thirty minutes with Churchill and I can correct this.' He added, 'We have got to be tough with Germany and I mean the German people, not just the Nazis. You either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past.'
. . .
Admiral Leahy was also pleased with it, explaining to Morgenthau that since the British were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar, they would have the odium of carrying the Morgenthau plan out. Henry Stimson, isolated on his estate by a hurricane that weekend, now learned of Morgenthau's triumph at Quebec. He wrote in his diary, 'On Saturday or Sunday [September 16-17] I learned from McCloy over the long distance telephone that the President has sent a decision flatly against us in regard to the treatment of Germany. Apparently he has gone over completely to the Morgenthau proposition and has gotten Churchill and Lord Cherwell with them. But the situation is a serious one and the cloud of it has hung over me pretty heavily over the weekend. It is a terrible thing to think that the total power of the United States and the United Kingdom in such a critical matter as this is in the hands of two men, both of whom are similar in their impulsiveness and their lack of systematic study.I have yet to meet a man who is not horrified with the "Carthaginian" attitude of the Treasury. It is Semitism gone wild for vengeance and, if it is ultimately carried out (I can't believe that it will be) it as sure as fate will lay the seeds for another war in the next generation. And yet these two men in a brief conference at Quebec with nobody to advise them except "yes-men," with no Cabinet officer with the President except Morgenthau, have taken this step and given directions for it to be carried out.'
. . .
Morgenthau continued to peddle his plan around Washington. He visited Roosevelt on the day before the president died, and again badgered him to adopt the plan. On the day the war ended, May 8, 1945, Morgenthau would resume his vicious campaign for the starvation of central Europe, this time with Harry S. Truman. Except for the purpose of facilitating the occupation, JCS.1He telephoned Henry Stimson, lunching at home, and complained that the Coordinating Committee was not carrying out his 'scorched earth' policy as hard as he wanted, particularly as related to the destruction of all oil and gasoline and the plants for making them in Germany, and Directive 1067 that ordained this. 067 defined, 'you [Eisenhower] will take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany nor designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.'
The U.S. army was protesting this senseless order. But Morgenthau wanted his evil will performed. Stimson privately dictated next day, 'I foresee hideous results from his influence in the near future.' In a memorandum to Mr. Truman dated May 16, Stimson outlined the probable consequences of such pestilence and famine in central Europe'political revolution and Communistic infiltration.' And he added a warning against the emotional plans to punish every German by starvation: 'The eighty million Germans and Austrians in central Europe today necessarily swing the balance of that continent.'
David Irving regards James Bacque as the 'expert' on postwar treatment of German soldiers. He does not even mention other living historians.
http://www.fpp.co.uk/Letters/History_03/Helga260103.html
David Irving replies:
The expert on this is James Bacque, respected Canadian author of Other Losses, whom you can reach by email at jabacque@csolve.net
Irving adds James Bacque to his speaker's roster:
http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:zh6ZNHrkIuQJ:www.hoffman-info.com/conference.html+%22david+irving%22+%22james+bacque%22&hl=en
Next year he hopes to host James Bacque, author of "Other Losses" and "Crimes and Mercies," and Count Nikolai Tolstoy, author of "The Minister and the Massacres," who was bankrupted by Lord Aldington (with the collusion of the British government), after Tolstoy had publicized British complicity in the murder of East European anti-communist refugees at the end of WWII.
Ernest Fisher, a US Army historian, assisted Bacque in assembling his materials.
http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:vttlGIn0dhUJ:www.jamesbacque.com/+bacque&hl=en
Other Losses has a foreword by US Army historian Col Dr Ernest F. Fisher Jr, who assisted Bacque for years in the research. An officer in the 101st Airborne in Germany in 1945, Fisher was appointed to a commission set up by US commander General Dwight Eisenhower to investigate atrocities committed by US soldiers against Germans. The commission exonerated the Americans, and Fisher called the decision "a whitewash".
Various confirmations of Sack's thesis:
http://www.johnsack.com/an_eye_for_an_eye_corroboration.htm
"It didn't happen," said the Executive Director of the World Jewish Congress on 60 Minutes in November 1993.
But already 60 Minutes had found corroborating evidence for An Eye for an Eye. "We went to Poland," said Correspondent Steve Kroft, "to conduct our own interviews with former prisoners at Swietochlowice, sixteen in all, including eight we found independently of John Sack or the German Federal Archives. And we heard the same stories over and over again."
And that wasn't all. According to Kroft,
There's evidence...beginning with this report of the British Foreign Office, written in 1945, which says, "Prisoners at Swietochlowice who do not die of starvation or aren't beaten to death are made to stand up to their necks, night after night until they die, in cold water."
A similar report can be found in the U.S. Congressional Record from 1946.
In the attic of the town hall of Swietochlowice, we found 1,580 death certificates for prisoners at the camp, many of them signed by Commandant Solomon Morel. And a Polish prosecutor...told us he's gathered enough information to charge Morel with beatings, physical and moral persecution, and driving prisoners to commit suicide...
We found out later that Morel...talked to the former Director of Archives at Yad Vashem, the pre-eminent Holocaust archive in Israel. According to Dr. Shmuel Krakowski, Morel called and wanted to be interviewed by Yad Vashem, saying that he was the commandant of a prison camp after the war and that he killed Nazis for revenge.
Since then, the revelations in An Eye for an Eye have been corroborated by The New York Times, by newspapers and newsmagazines in Germany, by scholars in the United States and the United Kingdom, by the archives of the Soviet secret police, in Moscow, and by the Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against the Polish Nation.
In November 1994, the former foreign editor of The New York Times wrote in a full-page story in the Times,
Polish authorities are investigating murder charges against Solomon Morel, a former secret police officer who served in the Communist resistance during the war. In the spring of 1945 he was put in charge of what had been a Nazi concentration camp at Swietochlowice, near Katowice.
Mr. Morel, who is Jewish, lost both parents and his two brothers during the war. Witnesses at the camp he commanded after the war have charged that he had hundreds of German civilians tortured and beaten to death, and killed some with his own hands...
He fled to Israel in 1993 and now lives in Tel Aviv.
The Times carried interviews with two Swietochlowice survivors, with the widow of a third survivor, and with John Sack.
In the spring of 1995, when An Eye for an Eye became a best-seller in Germany, German newspapers and newsmagazines hired historians to go to the German Federal Archives, in Koblenz, to double-check it. The book is "watertight," wrote the historian for Sueddeutsche Zeitung. "The facts stand," wrote the historian for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
. . .
For six years, scholars in the United States have backed up An Eye for an Eye. In November 1993, Antony Polonsky, Professor of East European Jewish History at Brandeis, wrote,
I read this extremely gripping and compelling account of the appalling events which accompanied the end of the war and the expulsion of the Germans...in one go. It was impossible to put down...
In my view, only two questions need to be raised. The first concerns the motivation of the author, and here I am convinced that Mr. Sack has tried, as he himself writes, to tell "something more than the story of Jewish revenge: the story of Jewish redemption."
The second is whether the story is true and what it is based on. Here, too, I am satisfied that the author is a serious researcher...The book is in fact a major contribution to our understanding.
. . .
The misdeeds of the almost entirely Jewish-led Polish political police--torture, murder, the forging of electoral results, deportations, etcetera--were notorious.
Deak cited An Eye for an Eye and said of it,
Documents on the Jewish torture and murder of German civilians, including women and children, in Polish concentration camps make for horrendous reading.
More corroboration came from Professor John Micgiel of Columbia and Professor Arno Mayer of Princeton, the author of Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?
The revelations in An Eye for an Eye became an accepted part of European history in May 1997, on the publication of Europe: a History by Professor Norman E. Davies of Oxford. Davies wrote,
Popular knowledge in [Poland] has always insisted that the notorious communist Security Office (UB) contained a disproportionate number of Jews (or rather ex-Jews), and that their crimes were heinous. But few hard facts were ever published, and the stories were dismissed with distaste.
. . .
The number of deaths inflicted by the communist regime on the German population is estimated at 60,000 to 80,000.
. . .
The district attorney for Katowice indicted Morel for crimes against the Polish nation. He sent policemen to Shlomo’s apartment, but Shlomo had fled to Tel Aviv. In December, 1998, the district attorney asked the Minister of Justice in Israel to extradite him, but the Minister replied that the statute of limitations for Shlomo’s crimes had expired in November, 1965. Interpol issued an international warrant for Shlomo, and he must now be arrested if he travels anywhere outside of Israel.
A new book, by John Dietrich, who served six years in the DIA, which supports Bacque's thesis.
The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy
by John Dietrich
[quote]In the Aftermath of War "The plan was designed to completely destroy the German economy, enslave millions of her citizens, and exterminate as many as 20 million people": John Dietrich, who served six years in the Defense Intelligence Agency, takes a hard, revisionist look at American policy toward Germany after WWII in The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy. Charting its origins, development and brief implementation, the author argues that the secretary of the treasury's plan for the demilitarization of Germany "thoroughly reflected" Roosevelt's opinions on postwar strategy (and that the president may have bribed Churchill to sign off on it); that the Soviet Union was the plan's sole beneficiary; and that the plan had far greater effects than anyone involved cared to admit.
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Bacque lists the 'reputable historians' who support him. Norman Finkelstein also regards him as legit.
http://www.londonsocialisthistorians.org/messageboard/forum0.pl/noframes/read/436
RESPONSE FROM JAMES BACQUE
Many historians have supported my work. They include Col. Dr Ernest F. Fisher, formerly A Senior Historian, United States Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC; Prof. Richard Overy, King's College, University of London; Prof. Ed Peterson, University of Wisconsin; Dr. Alfred De Zayas, formerly Senior Legal Counsel to the UN High Commission on Human Rights; Prof. Hans Koch, University of York, England; Prof. Ralph Raico, University of Buffalo. There are others--maybe these will do for now?
PS Stephen E. Ambrose was a strong supporter of my work and helped me to get published. He appeared on CBS Evening News and was quoted in Time Magazine in support of Other Losses. Suddenly, after a semester in the fall of 1989, at The US Army War College at Carlisle Barracks PA, he switched over to defending Eisenhower. He has never explained this sudden aberration.
PS to my earlier message (James Bacque)
I have just discovered, after cruising the web which I do only about once a year, that Prof. Norman G Finkelstein, whom I admire very much, supports and quotes from my work.--JB
Ambrose biography, detailing personal involvement with Eisenhower.
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Stephen-Ambrose
Stephen Edward Ambrose (January 10, 1936 - October 13, 2002) was a popular historian and biographer of Dwight Eisenhower. He had a Ph.D in History from the University of Wisconsin and taught history at the University of New Orleans from 1960 until his retirement in 1995.
Ambrose was the author of numerous bestselling books about World War II, including D-Day, Citizen Soldiers and The Victors; Undaunted Courage, about Lewis and Clark; and Nothing Like It in the World, about the construction of the Transcontinental Railroad. He was the founder of the Eisenhower Center and President of the National D-Day Museum in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was military advisor on the movie Saving Private Ryan, and was an executive producer on the television mini-series that was based on his work, Band of Brothers.
Eisenhower chose Ambrose as his biographer after admiring his work on Halleck: Lincoln's Chief of Staff, which was based on his doctoral dissertation. The resulting Eisenhower biographies were generally enthusiastic, but contained many criticisms of the former commander in chief.
Ambrose also wrote a three-volume biography of Richard Nixon, also generally positive, but his Band of Brothers (1993) and D-Day (1994), about the lives and fates of individual soldiers in the World War II invasion catapulted him out of the ranks of academic history and into best-sellerdom.
Ambrose difficulties with plagairism:
http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060618
Stephen Ambrose handled his first plagiarism scandal of the week with the graceful humility you'd expect from America's Uncle History. Over the weekend, the Weekly Standard's Fred Barnes nailed Ambrose for heisting several passages of The Wild Blue, his recent best seller about World War II B-24 bomber crews, from historian Thomas Childers. Ambrose had footnoted Childers but still passed off Childers' elegant prose as his own. Ambrose apologized immediately for the "mistake," blamed it on faulty attribution, and promised to place the text in quotations in future editions.
Barnes and Childers quickly pardoned Ambrose, and the only chiding Ambrose received was for his haste: He has written eight books in five years. He's a history factory, using his five kids as researchers and assistants to streamline the production process. "He writes so many books. I don't know how he can avoid making some mistakes," says former Sen. George McGovern, whose B-24 exploits are the chief subject of The Wild Blue. (Running a history-book mill can raise other complications besides bad attribution. Click here for the disturbing story of how Ambrose got the idea for The Wild Blue.)
Ambrose ducked plagiarism No. 1, but then Forbes.com's Mark Lewis started digging. On Monday, Lewis revealed that Ambrose lifted sentences from Jay Monaghan's Custer biography in his 1975 book Crazy Horse and Custer.Two days later, Lewis exposed Cases 3 and 4—pilferage in 1997's best seller Citizen Soldiers and 1991's Nixon: Ruin and Recovery. And today the New York Times' David Kirkpatrick discovered five more swiped phrases and passages in The Wild Blue. Ambrose's patriots can't fall back on the factory defense anymore: Two of the cases occurred when Ambrose was an obscure professor, before he became Stephen Ambrose Industries. Ambrose is more defiant than apologetic. Though he says he'll correct the books, he insists to the Times that, "I am not out there stealing other people's writings. If I am writing up a passage and it is a story I went to tell and this story fits and a part of it is from other people's writing, I just type it up that way and put it in a footnote."
Bacque's direct reply to critics, crucial to an understanding of the whole argument. It discredits Bischof and Overmanns, among the various court historians rounded up to defend Ambrose' beloved Eisenhower:
http://www.corax.org/revisionism/misc/bacque_letter.html
James Bacque Answers a Critic (8/20/1993)
This is a letter by James Bacque, author of Othe Losses. It appeared in The Times Literary Supplement of August 20, 1993.
Sir,-
It is every writer's delight to be attacked in a famous journal by a confused critic, so my thanks go to John Keegan for airing his views on my work in the TLS on July 23.
Mr Keegan has been misled by the editors of the book, "Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts against falsehood," which he cites to refute me. The principal editor, Stephen E. Ambrose, clearly does not know what he thinks from day to day, because he has varied wildly from strong approval of my book, "Other Losses," to snarling slanders of me personally, together with buffoonish misrepresentations of American army policies. Having kindly read my manuscript, he wrote to me as follows: "I am not arguing with the basic truth of your discovery...you have the goods on these guys, you have the quotes from those who were present and saw with their own eyes, you have the broad outline of a truth so terrible I really can't bear it...you really have made a major historical discovery..." It appears from the latest Ambrose writings that, indeed, the truth was something he could not bear.
The same might be said for his co-editor, Gunter Bischof, an Austrian. Keegan admires the "scholarship" of Bischof, but Bischof does not know a displaced persons camp from a prison camp. He chastises me for stating that there was a US Army prison camp at Ebensee in Austria: he says that the camp was for DPs. In fact, I have photocopies of General Mark Clark's secret report about the condition of prisoners of war in the camp, plus US Army medical reports of prisoners in the camp, plus eyewitness accounts of the catastrophe among dozens of thousands of prisoners, including the manuscript of a diary kept by the priest Franz Loidl who ministered to the dying. This manuscript is on deposit in the Church History Institute of the Catholic Theological Faculty, University of Vienna.
In the same book so admired by Keegan is a gross error made by Rudiger Overmanns, who does not even know the number of prisoners taken by the Americans. This was not 3.8 million as he says, but over 6 million, according to US Army records in Suitland, Maryland. Of course, this error, conveniently for Ambrose and Keegan, apparently diminishes the number of lives for which the Americans were responsible.
Underlying the Ambrose-Bischof book is a series on German prisoners edited by Erich Maschke. Underlying that series is no important documentation from the US Army archives in Washington. The author of the book on the American camps casually omits all the significant records that survived the paper purges of the late 1940s. However, for an expert judgment on the condition of American camps Mr Keegan may rely on the words of an American Lieutenant-Colonel who was in charge of the camps in France in 1945. In a report preserved at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry W. Allard wrote that "the standards of PW camps in the Com Z in Europe compare as only slightly better or even with the living conditions of the Japanese PW camps our men tell us about, and unfavourably with those of the Germans". Let us remember that after the war, the Americans executed Japanese for precisely the crimes referred to by Allard.
Mr Keegan does not accept the definition of the term "Other Losses" given me by Colonel Philip S. Lauben. He is unaware of the US Army report discovered by Richard Boylan, a senior archivist at the US National Archives, which confirms Lauben. The report plainly states that the "Other Loses" category of prisoners meant deaths and escapes. And finally, of course, 1,700,000 Germans, plus hundreds of thousands of other Europeans, are still missing from their families. This astounding fact is normally neglected by the Western apologists, unless they can also use it to hammer the Soviets, saying they all died in the Gulag. But now that the Soviets are gone, their archives are open and the truth at last emerges.
That truth is simple. The Soviets took some 4.1 million prisoners of war east and west, of whom some 600,000 died in slavery. Of the total take, some 2.4 million were Germans. Of these, some 450,600 died, the rest were sent home. Subtracting the 450,600 dead Germans from the missing 1.7 million, we see that some 1.25 million are still not accounted for. Of these, probably 100,000 - 200,000 died in Polish, Yugoslavian and other camps. The number remaining is very nearly the number I said in "Other Losses" of those who died among all Europeans taken prisoner in the West.
I wonder if Mr Keegan will consult the Soviet records before attacking them? The surprising thing about the Soviet records is that they are extensive, detailed, accurate and incriminating. For instance, on the subject of prisoners of war, these archives display a dossier for each prisoner, complete with capture records, biographical information, legal,labour and medical history, including X-ray photographs, and so on. The average is about fifteen pages per person. The dossier of Nobel prize winner Konrad Lorenz, the Austrian zoologist contains two hundred pages about him and his work. No such records exist anywhere in the West. In months of work in the archives of the West, I was never able to find the dossier for a single one of the 9 or so million prisoners held. Not one. But in the first hour in the NKVD/KGB archives, I found the archival boxes containing over 4 million personal dossiers. I was allowed to walk up and down the aisles, and take down and photocopy any box I chose at random, and did so. I have scores of photocopies of those records here in Toronto, and Mr Keegan is welcome to consult them. Or he may wish to visit Moscow. He will find interesting information beginning with the story of the Japanese prisoners. The Japanese authorities have long since determined that some 62,000 of their prisoners, chiefly in the Kwantung Army, died in the Gulag. The Soviets lied to the Japanese government for years about the number of deaths, first saying 3,800 had died, then about 4,000, then around 35,000. Finally, the Soviet archives were opened, and mirabile dictu, the death certificates were all there, totalling very nearly 62,000.
Do I hear Keegan protesting that Japan is not Germany? On his visit to Moscow, he may see for himself the Soviet records showing that the prisoners of various nationalities were often mixed together in the same camp, so that Japanese were enslaved beside Germans, were all treated the same way, and died in approximately the same ratio of much the same causes. Letters to me from individual prisoners and records at the Hoover Institution in Stanford all show independently of the Soviet archives that this was the case in more than thirty major camps
Let me also remind Keegan that the Poles long accused the Soviets of massacring some 14,000 officers at Katyn, but that the Soviet archives reveal that the true total was around 21,000. If John Keegan and his friends wish to attack the authenticity of the Soviet archives, they are going to have to show that the fragmentary documents in the Western archives, airy with lacunae and poxed with evasions, are superior to these tremendous archives which incriminate its masters for a horrifying crime against humanity. What will they say then? That the Soviets are hiding something?
JAMES BACQUE
422 Heath St. E.
Toronto, Ontario
From Crimes and Mercies, regarding the actual pressures on court historians and even lowly journalists, who have no training in 'historiographic methodologies', Fade's twenty five cent word for academic prejudices.
http://www.serendipity.li/hr/cm01.htm
We see today great institutions of public opinion — among them Le Monde and the New York Times — feverishly denying the Western Allied atrocities of the post-war period against Germany. For most people in the West, the denials rest on delusion, not evidence. The question never even becomes, 'Did the Allies do such things?' because the answer has been planted in everyone's heads already. 'NO, the Allies did not, because they could not.' For instance, the eminent British historian Michael Howard, reviewing for the Times Literary Supplement a book about Allied atrocities against Germans, admitted that although he was 'an innumerate historian' unqualified to judge the crucial statistics in the book, he could 'apply the criterion of inherent probability' to refute the book. 9 The French press and TV rose with rhetoric uncomplicated by evidence to denounce recent allegations that mass crimes were committed by the French army against the Germans. Stephen Ambrose also attacked a book about allied misdeeds by concluding that 'when scholars do the necessary research they will find [this book] to be worse than worthless'. 10 The answer is known before the evidence is consulted. In other words, belief is everything, evidence means nothing.
Count Nikolai Tolstoy, the renowned English writer, has been driven bankrupt and forbidden to publish on the subject of British treatment of prisoners of war under Lord Aldington. His books have been withdrawn from British libraries. His attempts at redress in British courts have been constantly frustrated in the UK, although the denial of his rights has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg. The alleged libel against Lord Aldington was converted by the courts and government into a libel against the history of the state. Against which there is no appeal.
The books of former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark have revealed tremendous civilian deaths in Iraq during the Gulf War which have never been admitted by any of the Allies who caused them. 11 No major publisher in the English-speaking world has dared to bring them out.
My fellow author Alfred de Zayas, a graduate of Harvard and of Göttingen, spent years researching and writing his book Nemesis at Potsdam, about the expulsions from the east of Germany. And then he had to spend ten years sending it round to almost a hundred publishers in the West before the manuscript was finally accepted. The president of one of the biggest houses in New York returned the manuscript with the note that he would never publish a book sympathetic to the Germans.
It is no good to respond that all these authors got published, and so freedom of discussion exists. The full weight of official disapproval has stifled the discussion by shrinking the audience. And once that happens the authors may be silenced by financial distress.
Another defence of Bacque, summarizing his opponents elementary errors, ulterior motives, and failure to consider the information taken from Soviet archives.
http://hnn.us/articles/1266.html
The revelations about the alleged plagiarism committed by Stephen E. Ambrose last year are not only important to American historians and the public but also vitally interesting to the authors of this article. We have both suffered considerable personal embarrassment as a result of incorrect and deceitful allegations made against us and our work. These were published in a book that Ambrose edited (with Gunter Bischof) entitled Eisenhower And The German POWs. Ambrose contributed the lead essay and he organized the conference, in New Orleans in December, 1990 at which the original papers were presented.(1)
In the fall of 1987, Bacque and Fisher met for the first time under the auspices of General Bruce Clark, to discuss some astonishing documents about United States Army prisoner of war camps in 1945 which Bacque had uncovered while researching his book Other Losses. Together, we went to the U.S. National Archives to research this subject. We also interviewed the late Forrest C. Pogue, the leading expert on the command structure of the army. We told him that our research had shown beyond our doubt, that in the U.S. and French prison camps in Europe in 1945-6, a vast tragedy had occurred, causing the needless deaths of approximately 800,000/900,000 Axis prisoners of war. Pogue advised us what we had to find was the smoking gun in Eisenhower's hand.(2)
In the course of the next few months' research together, we visited the National Archives in Washington many times, and the George C. Marshall Library in Lexington, Virginia. In the spring of 1988, Bacque had finished the draft of the manuscript and Fisher was preparing to write his foreword. Through the British historian M. R. D. Foot, Bacque was introduced to Ambrose, then the chief of the Eisenhower Center in New Orleans. Ambrose kindly read the manuscript, and offered many suggestions by mail, and during a two-day editing session at his cabin in Wisconsin. Among other things he said:
I have now read Other Losses and wish I had not. I have had nightmares every night since I started reading... You have a sensational if appalling story and it can no longer be suppressed, and I suppose (in truth I know) it must be published... I must withdraw my offer to write a Foreword; I just can't do it to Ike. I quarrel with many of your interpretations, I am not arguing with the basic truth of your discovery.... you have the goods on these guys, you have the quotes from those who were present and saw with their own eyes, you have the broad outline of a truth so terrible that I really can't bear it.... You really have made a major historical discovery, the full impact of which neither you nor I nor anyone can fully imagine.... I have written at length about your script to Alice Mayhew, my editor at Simon and Schuster.
[b]The manuscript was typeset incorporating many of Ambrose's suggestions, Fisher wrote the Introduction and the page proofs of the whole book were sent to Ambrose. He read them and handed them back to Fisher at a meeting of an historical association in Washington in the spring of 1989, with the words, "This book destroys my life's work."
Nevertheless he bravely stood by his earlier words when reporters came to him for comments after the book was published in Canada in September, 1989. He largely confirmed Other Losses to the interviewer for the Dan Rather Evening News. He said to Time magazine (October 2, 1989, International edition) that it was "a major historical discovery. We as Americans can't duck the fact that terrible things happened and they happened at the end of a war we fought for decency and democracy and freedom, and they are not excusable." When he was questioned by a student at a lecture in British Columbia why he had not himself discovered the evidence that appeared in Other Losses, he said frankly that he had never thought to look.
Sometime during the autumn of 1989, Ambrose accepted an appointment to lecture at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. It appears he suffered a sea-change in his attitude, for he soon began organizing a conference to be held at the Eisenhower Center, which eventuated in the book Eisenhower and The German POWs.
In February, 1990 he also published a review in the New York Times Book Review, under very odd circumstances. Although the Times apparently has a policy not to print reviews from writers who have helped to edit a book under review, the paper ran Ambrose's review of Other Losses. This appeared on page one, despite the fact that the book was not yet published in the U.S., was by an author never before published in the U.S., and was issued by a minor publisher on the west coast. Clearly it was the fame of Ambrose which had secured the review, its length and prominence.
In that slam-bang attack presented as a review, Ambrose admitted frankly that he had not done the research necessary to confute the book's thesis. He wrote, "When the necessary research is done, it will be seen that...." and went on to say that the book is "spectacularly flawed."
In December, Ambrose convoked his conference on the subject of Eisenhower and the German prisoners of war. A number of scholars presented the papers which constitute the book. These writers we have come to think of as "The Ike-minded." Although there are very many errors in the book which confuse and obscure history, we shall correct only the errors relating to the outstanding discovery in Other Losses, the number of the dead in American and French camps.
In the first place, Ambrose and the Ike-minded in his book make the fundamental error of relying on a secondary source, the report of the Maschke Commission in Germany, when much better primary sources were available. The Maschke report purports to give an account of the fate of German prisoners of war in allied hands after World War Two. The editors did not visit the Soviet archives because these were closed. The American prisoner of war records were open at the time of the research and writing, but the writer Kurt W. Boehme did not visit them.
These U.S. POW archives themselves were reduced by deliberate destruction sometime in the late 1940s, according to Eddy Reese, a senior archivist in Modern Military Records. But much survived, and it was among these papers, which we researched for many months through 1986-7 that we found the basic evidence for the deaths in American and French camps. For instance, we found the total of captives in U.S. hands in northwest Europe under Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) command in June 1945, which is 5,224,310. And in the same sets of papers, we found the detailed statistical summaries week by week reporting captures, transfers, discharges of prisoners, including the ominous heading, Other Losses. The meaning of this term was explained by Col. Philip S. Lauben, whose name we found on the circulation list for these G2 papers. Lauben was expert, having been head of the German Affairs Branch of SHAEF and he was unequivocal: Other Losses meant deaths, and "very very minor escapes," fewer than two per cent. It was only much later, under heavy pressure from the U.S. Army that Lauben was induced to recant. (3)
The total of prisoners of war captured was clear enough, but Ambrose and the Ike-minded do not accept U.S. army documents as sufficient evidence. They reduce the number of prisoners to 3,800,000 by a very simple sleight-of-hand. They point out that some of the prisoners were designated as Disarmed Enemy Forces, and they then fail to give any further accounting for them. This reduces the pool of potential victims, and thus inflates the proportion of those alleged to have died. It also eliminates from the accounts 1,400,000 of the captives who were worst treated, and who bore the largest proportion of losses.
Of the prisoners of war, they say, some 700,000 were sent to the French. Among the remainder, some 3,097,000, the Ike-minded say that 4,537 died. This is a very challenging statistic. Ambrose's book reports that the death total of 4,537 constitutes a loss ratio of 0.1%, while neglecting to report the time period. This is one of their typical evasions, which usually obscure the picture. We can partly rectify it here.
The annual death rate for German civilians in the 1930s was around 12 deaths per 1,000 people. The ambient death rate in 1945 in central-west Europe among civilians was about the same. That 12 figure includes the most vulnerable in society, babies and old people. Among young men in peacetime, the death rate is always far lower. For instance, among resting American soldiers in base camp, it was less than one third of that rate, or about 3.8. A total of 4,537 deaths among 3,097,000 implies a death rate of 1.46 (per annum); since 80 percent of the prisoners were kept on average 6 months, this death total implies a rate of around 3.8. Thus the Ike-minded ask us to believe that the prisoners who even Ambrose has admitted were starving, thirsty, living in mudholes for long periods, somehow-miraculously-were just as healthy as were the well-fed, well-rested and well-clothed U.S. soldiers living in base camp.
But the tedious statistical arguments have been settled by the appearance on the scene of Soviet files. When the Soviet archives on prisoners of war for the 20th century were opened after 1990, Bacque immediately flew to Moscow where he was admitted to the gloomy KGB archives. There he was shown boxes containing millions of documents relating to prisoners of war of every nationality from World War II. He was allowed to patrol those dim aisles, to take down any box he wished and to photocopy any documents he wanted. He brought away from Moscow scores of copies of typical entries, including medical and legal records for individual prisoners, ID documentation, date of death or discharge. He also found the statistical summary of the fate of German prisoners of war.
This was a major find because it would confirm or destroy the work in Other Losses. The Germans knew, by a thorough survey, how many prisoners had never come home--about 1,400,000. The Soviet death figure would settle the argument between Ambrose and Other Losses as follows: from the missing 1,400,000 one subtracts the 800,000/900,000 deaths alleged in Other Losses to determine that there must have been 500,000 to 600,000 dead in Soviet captivity.
In forthright manner in several reports, most notably the Bulanov Report dated 28 October, 1956, the Soviets recorded the fate of 2,389,560 Germans, of whom 450,600 died., including 93,900 as they were being transferred from the front to the rear. A further 66,481 civilians died among people rounded up to replace dead and escaped prisoners. The total of the dead actually recorded in the Soviet archives is 517,081.
The authenticity of the Soviet archives is certain. The deaths of Japanese prisoners of war shown in the KGB prisoner archives match almost exactly the figures determined by the Japanese themselves. The Soviet massacre of Polish prisoners at Katyn in 1940 is also confirmed in the KGB archives. Finally, the figures in Other Losses when tallied with the German figures for their own missing, confirm the KGB figures.
This amazing confirmation was never been admitted or discussed by Ambrose or any of the Ike-minded. No American publisher has offered to take on either of the books that have presented this research. They have, however, been published in the UK, Canada and Germany.(4)
Soon after this discovery, there was placed in our hands the "smoking gun" demanded by Forrest C. Pogue. This was in the form of a letter sent from Eisenhower's HQ to all German cities and towns under SHAEF's control, dated May 9 1945. In it, the Germans are told that anyone who gathers together food for the purpose of taking it to the prisoner of war camps was liable to be shot. It was also a crime punishable by death to take food to the prisoners. We have eye-witness evidence of the killing of several women and of prisoners near them, by guards at American camps.
The personal consequences of all this for the authors have been distressing, but far worse has been the effect on American and German history. Because of the enormous influence of Ambrose and the New York Times, most American reviewers dismissed Other Losses as sensationalist trash, or falsehood as Ambrose called it. So the public has been deprived of their right to informed public debate.
We are neither of us feeling much Schadenfreude these days. We are upset that Stephen E. Ambrose did not live up to what is implied in his letter to Bacque, that this story "can no longer be suppressed."
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