That history might have turned out very differently had Hitler not declared war on the Soviet Union and United States?

"The House I Live In" captured the Jewish community's hope for social inclusion after Pearl Harbor. With a common enemy, Jewish leaders believed all Americans could join together in a unified campaign to defeat the Nazis. The United States' declaration of war weakened domestic anti-Semites who had used American neutrality as the focus of their bigoted campaigns. Look magazine wrote that Hitler had discredited anti-Semitism; meanwhile the U.S. Senate halted its investigation of Jewish moviemakers."

Marc Dollinger, Quest For Inclusion: Jews and Liberalism in Modern America (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.77

"Unfortunately, Jewish leaders proved mistaken in almost all their wartime analyses. Popular opposition to Hitler did little to stave off domestic anti-Semitism, which took a turn for the worse during the war years. When pollsters asked Americans in 1940 if they heard any criticism or talk against the Jews in the last six months, almost half responded in the affirmative. In 1942, that number inched higher and topped out at 64 percent by 1946. In 1945, more than half of those polled believed that American Jews possessed too much power, a steep climb from prewar levels. The war did not, as communal leaders hoped, ease the integration of Jews into the American mainstream."

Ibid., p.78

"While the efforts of the General Jewish Council to protect the free speech rights of Nazi sympathizers established the civil libertarian credentials of the organized Jewish community, it did little to stem a rising tide of domestic anti-Semitism. In 1940, the American Jewish Committee reported, "Anti-Jewish groups at home attempted to take advantage of the war tension to disunite American democratic forces by appeals to racial and religious hatred." A poll in May of that year revealed that 64 percent of the American people considered the defeat of Hitler less important than peace. When the Congress considered ending the European embargo, pro-German groups rallied to prevent what would have been significant American aid to the Allied forces. In 1941, the AJC expressed concern over the influence of Nazi sympathizers on American soil: "Organized anti-Semitism in the United States lost the distinction of being confined to a small group of native pro-fascists and Bundists." The AJC concluded that by the middle of the year, "Nazi-inspired anti-Semitism had become a potent factor in the American political scene."

As late as July 1942, a full seven months after American entry into the war allied the entire nation against Hitler, 44 percent of those polled still believed American Jews possessed too much power and influence. While the AJC explained that it "refrains from publicizing the activities [of anti-Semites] because of the danger of focusing too much attention on problems of anti-Semitism" and preferred to follow what it called an "attitude of dignity rather than defense," Rabbi Stephen S. Wise wondered out loud if a Hitleresque movement could someday dominate American politics. Jewish leaders learned that, contrary to sociological research conducted by their own organizations, intergroup hostility did not grow from ignorance."

Ibid., p.73

Without the assistance of the Soviet Union and the United States, Britain would have went bankrupt and lost the war. If Britain had sued for and made an independent peace, it is doubtful the U.S. could have invaded Europe.

"As a consequence, England, far from remaining solvent until the end of 1941 at least (as had been forecast in February 1940), would exhaust her gold and dollar reserves by December 1940. In a word, Britain would have been bankrupt: incapable of either waging war or of sustaining her national life. In that summer of heroic attitudes, therefore, when the English scanned the skies for the Luftwaffe and the sea for the German army, and thrilled to Churchillian rhetoric on the wireless, England's existence as an independent, self-sustaining power was reckoned by the Government to have just four months to run."

Correlli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc, 1972), pp.14-15

Without doubt , no war on Russia would have led to British defeat , (indirectly ) by the end of 41-42.
Churchill could not have withstood the impending defeat and loss of the middle east and the Suez Canal , Gibralter and Malta would have followed.
Would GB have gone bust , without lend lease yes, even with it defeat would have followed.
America and Germany would not have gone to war had Barbarossa not been ordered and had Egypt been lost prior to Pearl Harbour .
Its difficult to see how the middle east could have been held against another 2-3 divisions and a concentrated effort to defeat British forces.
Against this background of defeat and with the threat of invasion still there , could WSC have hung on ?

Imagine the catastrophe that would have befell the Empire if America did not enter the war and the Japanese were able to throw all their weight behind an attack upon Australia and New Zealand, not to mention Singapore, which they managed to take anyway.

An invasion of Australia , would have been impossible to sustain so far away from home in such a hostile land as the North.
The Aussies moved everything down to almost the last cow away from the north .
Had they landed I doubt if they could have been able to make much progreess.
It would certainly have drawn America in , could the Japanese have resisted Luzon etc , I don't think so.
Interesting but extremely unlikely.
Empire was a fading( no pun intended) star by 39 , it could not have lasted in any case.

Imagine the catastrophe that would have befell the Empire if America did not enter the war and the Japanese were able to throw all their weight behind an attack upon Australia and New Zealand, not to mention Singapore, which they managed to take anyway.
The entirety of the Australian Defence Forces were handed over to the American General Douglas MacArthur during World War 2. I think United States would have helped Australia, if not annexed it - and I doubt many Australians would have objected - had the British Empire collapsed.

Cerb and jacjk r right. theres no w`ay a jap invasion wud be successful plus the yanks vwould help

The decline of the Empire was an entirely conscious choice. It was by no means inevitable.

1.) The moralising internationalists put their faith in the League of Nations which had no real power and refused to revive the 'balance of power' strategy until it was too late.

2.) This caused the British to make an unnecessary enemy of Italy during the Abyssinia crisis, creating a possible third enemy in the Mediterranean.

3.) The Anglo-Japanese alliance was not renewed because of fear of offending the USA, even when the possibility of an American alliance was not on the table. This drove the Japanese into the arms of Germany and created an enormous threat in the East.

4.) The British refused for years to make a formal alliance with France lest Germany be offended. Indeed, the guarantee made to France of British assistance during a German attack was discarded after the Great War. The British opposed the efforts of France to break up Germany in the 20s.

5.) Disarmament throughout the 1920s because of the efforts of Churchill and the pacifists.

6.) The insane eastern borders of Germany were created in the name of 'morality' and 'self-determination' as opposed to the national interests of Britain. It was well-known that Germany was only strengthened by this, as it was no longer held in check by the Dual Monarchy or Imperial Russia in the South and East but by weak states with large German minorities.

7.) Hitler offered an alliance to the British again and again. Germany was the primary threat to British power. Japan and Italy would have ceased to be threats with the advent of a German alliance. The British ruling classes would have none of it because such an alliance would have been 'immoral', even though Hitler was sincere in his efforts.

8.) The men who governed the Empire during the 20s and 30s were weaklings, especially Baldwin and MacDonald.

9.) William Lyon MacKenzie King was allowed to destroy the unity of the Empire at the Imperial Conferences.

10.) Indian nationalism was created and fostered in public schools created by the British and urged on at the insistence of British moralists.

11.) British economic strength was undermined by the dogma of FREE TRADE. It was the free trade ideology which ultimately ruined the Empire, as the resources of the Empire were not developed because it was cheaper at the time to import products from Germany. Many of the colonies traded more actively with Germany than with Britain as well.

12.) The colonies were not run in a manner which would have strengthened British power. Indeed, it was the welfare and progress of their inhabitants which mattered most to the British.

13.) This culminated in Lend-Lease which destroyed British economic power for good and made Britain into an American industrial colony.

14.) The private press was used by special interests (the Jews especially) to pressure the government into making rash decisions not in the best interests of Britain.

I can cite many other examples, but the decline of the British Empire was not inevitable. It was the logical result of elevating 'morality' above 'power' in terms of calculating the national interest. The British Empire declined because of the bad policies which were consciously made by its pathetic democratic leaders, a process which continues to this day.

Fade Japan's war in China was based on the desire to aquire new resources by force.
GB/ Japan was never going to happen.
Empire is all about exploiting people and taking resources and wealth fromon e nation to another.
Empire could not last , it was a past event and would , perhaps not at once but within a short time come to an end. WW1 started this progression WW2 hastened and ensured the end of empire.

Hitler and GB , his views on race and NSDAP view on what was the "new order" it was never going to happen.
Lend lease , without it GB could not have gone on and it was as near as FDR could go without declaring war.
GB was almost broke and could not afford to go on.
Look at this for an odd example , the same types jigs and machine tools which GB bought from America , were also sold to Germany would them there would have been no Luftwaffe .

:: Fade Japan's war in China was based on the desire to aquire new resources by force.

And this policy was a great irritation to the Americans. The British did not renew the Anglo-Japanese treaty because of fear of American ill will, even though it was this decision which made Japan into a possible enemy.

:: GB/ Japan was never going to happen.

The British refusal to renew the Anglo-Japanese treaty made Japan an enemy of Britain whereas it had previously been an ally. During the Great War, dominion troops were transported to the European theatre on Japanese ships.

:: Empire is all about exploiting people and taking resources and wealth fromon e nation to another.

This is a lie. The British never had an exploitive colonial policy along the lines of the French or the Belgians. Far from it. British imperialism was about bringing 'progress' and 'civilisation' to the colonies through the imposition of orderly civil government. It was the welfare of the native inhabitants of the colonies that took precedence over British self-interest.

"The British governing classes saw the native races of the colonial empire, therefore, rather as old family tenants or cottagers; as a responsibility, rather than instruments of British power. This attitude, coupled with the universal moralism, determined British colonial policy: the colonial empire existed first and foremost in the interests of its native peoples, not of Britain.

This was a fundamental principle, which in the words of one historian 'grew out of the circumstances and ideals of an earlier and easier age', with 'double parentage in the evangelican and free-trade movements'. The principle was restated in 1923 under a Conservative Government with regard to India and Kenya:

Principally, Kenya is an African territory and His Majesty's Government think it necessary to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African nation must be paramount . . . in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population . . .the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races.
In West Africa too, in the words of Sir George Fiddes, the Permanent Under-Secretary to the Colonial Office until 1928: 'The Colonial Office recognises two sets of clients . . . the natives and the merchants. If their interests clash, those of the natives must come first . . .'

Sir George Fiddes was aware that:

It would be easy enough, with modern resources, to hold the country down; and it would not be difficult to obliterate all traces of native civilisation, and to impose on the inhabitants a parody of Western modes of life and habits. But if our ideal is to promote the evolution of the highest civilisation of which the native mind may be capable, it is only done -- as it is being done -- by a system of indirect rule [through the tribal chiefs].
British colonial policy between the wars was therefore an essay in altruism. Yet however admirable the British respect for the cultures and personalities of the peoples under their rule, however Christian the British spirit of guardianship, British colonial policy was an absurdity when considered in terms of British power. The colonies were not so much an empire as the field for an oversees Toynbee Hall mission. The contrast with the colonial policies of the French, Dutch, and Belgians was striking, for it was the curious idea of these nations that the purpose of having an empire was to make the imperial power richer and stronger. As a British colonial servant wrote in 1947:

British policy starts from the point that the African is the end in himself. . . We may be muddlers but we see ourselves as Trustees who are to hand over their trust as the earliest practical moment. French policy, on the other hand, is not muddled, but it starts from the point that what matters most is not the African, but France. It never rids itself of preoccupation about military manpower, war supplies, strategic bases. The end is not the African but what he can contribute to France's political-military position as a World Power.
The European colonial empires were great State enterprises, organised and directed from head office in pursuit of clear and logical policies; with efficient technical and medical services, and staffed by ambitious careerists throughly trained beforehand in colonial staff schools, men who were determined to turn their subject races as far as possibile into their own national likenesses.

The British colonial empire in the 1920s, on the other hand, had no 'policy' in the French sense: 'In my day', a colonial servant of the era told an American inquirer, 'we had not all forgotten Aristotle I was continually asking, "What is the end or object of this endevour?" But no one could or would give me an answer.'

Such policy as there was originated in less clear strategic directives from the Colonial Office in London than from empirical decisions taken locally in the colonies. This was perhaps not surprising when the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office from 1938 onwards, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, could assert in a book about the workings of the Colonial Office: 'Colonial Policy does not come within my present scope.'

It was possible that Sir Cosmo, and perhaps his colleagues and predecessors too, thought that a clear policy was inherently a bad thing, for it was his belief that 'we think too much and feel too little. More than machinery we need humanity. More than cleverness we need kindness and gentleness'.

These sentiments were shared by Sir Ralph Furse, who was in charge of recruitment to the colonial services from 1919 to 1948, a man who himself was, in one writer's judgment, 'a very largely unreconstructed Victorian country gentleman . . . essentially an optimist and a humanist' whose view of civil service recruitment 'was moral, not scientific', and who remarked that Plato had been 'one of the main influences in his "religious life"'. Furse had been at Balliol with Lord Milner, and his father-in-law was the poet and historian, Sir Henry Newbolt; he was therefore steeped in romantic, chivalric imperialism of the late Victorian age. To staff the administration of the colonies, Furse and his colleagues looked for like-minded men 'from stock that has proved its worth, generation by generation, in the professions or in public service . . . reared in the faith that duty and chivalry are of more account than ambition and self-seeking'. The public schools provided just what Furse wanted; it was after all their purpose. So British colonial administrators were, in the wrods of the Warren Fisher Report to the Colonial Service in 1929, men 'of vision, high ideals of service, fearless all, the team spirit. . .' In contrast to the French, who were always looking to Paris, they were immersed in the affairs and the peoples of their own colony, even their own district. A colonial policy in any sense of a broad conception was therefore no more likely to emerge from the words of one Cyprus and Gold Coast colonial servant: 'The best administrative officers were not those who had high-falutin' ideas [about policy] but who gave their whole minds to their daily chores -- restraining here, encouraging there, advancing everywhere, with never a thought of the wider implications of their efforts.'

The British colonial servants saw their task as one of efficient, fair public administration, of providing justice, law and order: the Roman imperial virtues. They tended to neglect -- as did the Colonial Office itself -- the modern importance of science and economics, subjects they understoodably found alien and somewhat uncomfortable. Thus, although the British showed a far more tender regard for native culture than other colonial nations, British colonies were often backward in research and technical services, for the staffing of which British education in any case made small provision. In 1929 the Headmaster of Harrow, in a book on, education -- largely devoted to the importance therein of religion -- noted that 'agriculture and production in the Dominions, and particularly the tropical dependencies, require the services of many trained botanists and zoologists, but they are not to be had. . . '

It was an example of this blind-spot in the British approach to colonies that, although it was in 1919 that they took over the former German colony of Tanganyika, they did not reopen the German tropical agriculture research station there until after 1927. British neglect of such technical services was compounded by the fragmentation of the colonial empire. The Committee on Colonial Scientific and Research Services reported in 1927: 'Science knows no boundries, yet, broadly speaking, scientific investigation in the Colonial Empire depends upon the individual and unrelated efforts of over thirty distinct administrations'.

Lack of research and development was one shackle on the economic exploitation of the colonies; the primacy given to the interests of the native was another shackle, and in some countries perhaps a more decisive one. Native systems of land-holding and cultivation, like peasant agriculture in Europe, were a barrier to a highly-capitalised, highly efficient production. Nevertheless, in British West Africa colonial governments twice, in 1907 and again in 1920, refused to allow Lord Leverhulme to set up the plantation system for the production of palm oil, under which the natives became workers on huge estates. A memorandum of 1926 by Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor of Nigeria, argued that it was 'fundamental doctrine' on moral grounds that native systems of land-holding should be protected. The only justification of British rule in the tropics, in his view, was the conferring on the native peoples of 'benefits they could not confer on themselves'. Therefore 'Land policy . . . should aim, primarily, mainly, and eventually at the development of the agricultural resources of these countries their the agency of the indigenous populations.'

Ibid., pp.124-128

I don't know, Fade. The British attack on the Boers was a pretty damn cynical maneuver.


Petr

:: Empire could not last , it was a past event and would , perhaps not at once but within a short time come to an end.

This is utterly false. The decline of the Empire was an entirely CONSCIOUS choice. Numerous examples illustrate this: the denounement of the Empire by William Lyon MacKenzie King at the Imperial Conferences in the '20s, the cultivation of the Indian Nationalists, the lack of development in the colonies caused by the 'natives first' policy, moralising internationalism, the dogma of free trade which undermined the solidarity of the Empire and so on and so on.

:: WW1 started this progression WW2 hastened and ensured the end of empire.

This is simply not true. In the immediate aftermath of WW1, Lloyd George and his government were committed to imperial renewal. They had 'learned their lesson'. But as the years went by, the moralising internationalists triumphed once again. These were the people who ultimately destroyed the Empire through disarmament, free trade, and high-mindedness. The rot actually began towards the end of the 19th century, but had the British leadership been willing, the decline could have easily been reversed.

:: Hitler and GB , his views on race and NSDAP view on what was the "new order" it was never going to happen.

Hitler's views struck the Victorian Christian gentlemen who ruled the British Empire during the '30s as profoundly immoral. It was their moralising internationalism and their high-mindedness that guided them into the catastrophe that was WW2. The USELESS League of Nations was a centerpiece of British foreign policy. These people ACTUALLY BELIEVED that war could be abolished through internationalism. Any conflict between any two nations anywhere in the world therefore, on the basis of this insane policy, became a concern for the British. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia is the best example of this. Although the Italian invasion DID NOT pose any threat whatsoever to British power, this insane moralising high-mindedness led the British to make an unnecessary enemy out of Italy.

:: Lend lease , without it GB could not have gone on and it was as near as FDR could go without declaring war.

But why was there a war in the first place? That is the big question. How did the British find themselves in such a catastrophe to begin with? Again, I will point to Barnett's excellent book: it was the notion that 'morality' as opposed to 'self-interest' should be the guiding principle of British foreign policy that caused the conflict.

:: GB was almost broke and could not afford to go on.

But why was it broke? Why had the resources of the Empire not been developed in the 20s and 30s? Why were the British so reliant upon the Americans? Why did they not build their own industries in Canada, sheltered from any air attack?

:: Look at this for an odd example , the same types jigs and machine tools which GB bought from America , were also sold to Germany would them there would have been no Luftwaffe .

Once again, why was British industry in the state it was at the outbreak of WW2? Why had the British sat back and let the Americans and British invade their home market? The decline, as Barnett lucidly illustrates, was an entirely conscious process, the product of bad policies.

:: I don't know, Fade. The British attack on the Boers was a pretty damn cynical maneuver.

And South Africa was more or less independent later under Smuts because of British magnamity in victory. The South Africans, in fact, urged over and over again that the British treat the defeated Germans the same way the British treated the Boers.

Ooh, the British gave Boers some kind of autonomy! How generous! They should not have invaded them (and decimated their civilian population) in the first place.


And by the way - the British colonial empire was more or less dependent on India. Once that "crown jewel" was lost, it was easy for the rest of the empire to secede.

Now then. WHAT exactly could have British done once the Indian nationalism began to rise? Do you think they could have kept India as a part of their empire WITH FORCE?

With few divisions in a country of hundreds of millions?


Petr

:: Ooh, the British gave Boers some kind of autonomy! How generous!

South Africa was for all intents and purposes an independent country by World War 2. Not only that, but its security was also being subsidised by the Royal Navy and it was allowed to wreck the Empire (in alliance with the Canadians) at the imperial conferences in the 20s.

:: They should not have invaded them (and decimated their civilian population) in the first place.

What caused the Boer War, Petr?

:: And by the way - the British colonial empire was more or less dependent on India.

India was an enormous burden to Britain, not an asset. It was the defence of India that led to British security commitments in the Middle East and Southeast Asia as well. And for what? What in India was worth such an enormous investment of British resources? Nothing. It was British romanticism and sentimentality that attached Britain to India, not self-interest. Britain would have been far better off, on balance, ditching India years before it did.

:: Once that "crown jewel" was lost, it was easy for the rest of the empire to secede.

But you are missing the point: the Empire itself was, on balance, a burden, not an asset, from the perspective of British power. It was the commitment to India that led to the commitments in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. What did Britain ever get in return for this enormous investment of British resources? Better yet, what did Britain even get from the dominions in return for the British guarantee of their security?

:: Now then. WHAT exactly could have British done once the Indian nationalism began to rise?

The Congress Party was utterly unrepresentative of the Indian people. It could have been put down quite easily, but the British moralists like Montagu :jew: would have none of it. In fact, Indian nationalism was a product of the Indian middle class which had so long been fostered by the British themselves. It was the British sentiments and ideals they instilled in the Indian middle class, through public education, that led to Indian nationalism. The problem was entirely their own baby.

:: Do you think they could have kept India as a part of their empire WITH FORCE?

Absolutely. The Congress Party could have been easily smashed. It did not represent the Indian people anyway before the war.

:: With few divisions in a country of hundreds of millions?

Yet that country had no problem with authoritarian rule until the British themselves began to spread their own ideals there. And besides, the Congress Party was not supported in the 20s by the Indian masses anyway.

- "What caused the Boer War, Petr?"


Bunch of greedy (many of them Jewish) capitalists in London wanting to get their hands on Boer national resources, plus Cecil Rhodes' self-indulgent ambitions.

Do you have a better explanation, perhaps?



- "... it was allowed to wreck the Empire (in alliance with the Canadians) at the imperial conferences in the 20s."

If that is true:

Yee-haa! Go Boers!


Petr

And by the way - do you think that the relationship of British Empire with IRELAND was more philanthropic than exploitative?


Petr

- "In fact, Indian nationalism was a product of the Indian middle class which had so long been fostered by the British themselves."


What about the sepoy rebellion? British rule was very disturbed by this rebellion of a very limited scale.

Face it - British wouldn't have had any chance of Indians had collectively decided to get rid of them in this kind primitive tribal manner that had nothing to do with romanticism.

Think about the fall of Shah in Iran.


Petr

:: If that is true: Yee-haa! Go Boers!

And where are the Boers today, Petr?

:: Bunch of greedy (many of them Jewish) capitalists in London wanting to get their hands on Boer national resources, plus Cecil Rhodes' self-indulgent ambitions.

Lets see your evidence.

:: Do you have a better explanation, perhaps?

Yes, actually I do. But lets see you support this case of yours first.

:: And by the way - do you think that the relationship of British Empire with IRELAND was more philanthropic than exploitative?

In the twentieth century? Absolutely. British foreign policy viz Ireland had come a long way since 1848.

:: What about the sepoy rebellion?

What about it? Don't confuse religious fundamentalism with nationalism.

:: British rule was very disturbed by this rebellion of a very limited scale.

How so?

:: Face it - British wouldn't have had any chance of Indians had collectively decided to get rid of them in this kind primitive tribal manner that had nothing to do with romanticism.

But the Indians never did decide to collectively get rid of the British. Instead, there was a small minority of Indian radicals that took it upon itself to speak in India's name. Eventually, they got what they wanted. And just as many predicted, India disintegrated.

My evidence for the Boer war?

Well, just to begin with, Yggdrasil's opinion, to which I usually give much credit:


"The Boer War was provoked by no more than a dozen men.

The few individuals who wanted war, Barnato (Issacs) , Beit, Wertheim and the rest of the IP gang were well known to the Boers. They lobbied the legislatures of the Boer Republics and certainly disclosed exactly what they wanted and why.

They then staged and armed coup, which the Boers easily defeated. But then the Boers set the conspirators free and did absolutely nothing to the IP gang of sponsors.

Being thus encouraged by the lack of any personal costs associated with plotting violence against the Boers, Issacs, Beit, Wertheim and the rest of the IP gang lobbied Britain to conquer the Boers."

http://home.ddc.net/ygg/cwar/pillar4.htm


And the inane ambitions of Cecil Rhodes - "from Cap to Cairo" - are well known. Boers just stood there on his way.

What's your version for this story?


Petr

- "How so?"


Well, apparently it was mainly due to this primitive rebellion that the Westernized, educated and nationally conscious class of Indians came to existence.


"In the aftermath of the rebellion, the British government decided to take India under the direct control of Crown under the rule of British Raj. A Viceroy was appointed to represent the Crown. The British embarked on a program of reform, trying to integrate Indian higher castes and rulers into the government and abolishing the East India Company.

They stopped land grabs, decreed religious tolerance and admitted Indians into civil service, albeit mainly as subordinates. "

http://www.ccds.charlotte.nc.us/touma/sepoy_rebellion.htm


So, by appeasing Indian elites, the British got, instead of a new rebellion, an independent Indian intelligentsia and civil disobedience in the long run.


Petr

The entirety of the Australian Defence Forces were handed over to the American General Douglas MacArthur during World War 2. I think United States would have helped Australia, if not annexed it - and I doubt many Australians would have objected - had the British Empire collapsed.

In point of fact, America essentially annexed Australia shortly after the fall of Singapore, in all but name. America has exercised de facto sovereignty over Australia ever since we provided them with the naval and other military and material support that Britain promised them and then reneged upon. No Prime Minister of Australia (unlike New Zealand) has ever done anything the U.S. wouldn't approve of, and they even fought alongside us in Vietnam. We haven't actually added any stars to our flag, and they're responsible for their own budgetary issues (during peacetime, anyway), but otherwise, Australia is far more an integrated part of the United States than, say, Puerto Rico.

GB/ Japan was never going to happen.

What are you talking about? Japan and Britain had been in a military alliance since at least the First World War (I don't recall the year the alliance was made formal). Japan wanted to renew their treaty of alliance, but Britain refused. Britain's territorial possessions in Asia were not a threat to the creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere within the context of such an alliance, so there was no reason for Japan not to be in favor of it (as they were).

I don't know, Fade. The British attack on the Boers was a pretty damn cynical maneuver.

The patronizing sympathy the British felt for their imperial Negroes did not extend to their fellow Whites, unfortunately. The British were very active in trying to abolish Black slavery while their own lads were chained to factory machines and impressed into hauling coal carts and being chimney sweeps, for crying out loud.

India was an enormous burden to Britain, not an asset. It was the defence of India that led to British security commitments in the Middle East and Southeast Asia as well. And for what? What in India was worth such an enormous investment of British resources? Nothing. It was British romanticism and sentimentality that attached Britain to India, not self-interest. Britain would have been far better off, on balance, ditching India years before it did.

I tend to agree. I mean, what great natural resources did India have to offer? Indigo, jute and colorful feathers, perhaps?

And by the way - do you think that the relationship of British Empire with IRELAND was more philanthropic than exploitative?

Again, the British elites of that period had a great deal of sympathy for the lesser races. The Irish, much like the Boers, just didn't qualify. This is a classic example of the liberal tendency to invert the natural way of being. One would, of course, naturally sympathize more with the Boers and the Irish, from an English/British perspective, but the sappy liberal democratists in charge of Britain reserved their sympathies for Negroes, Hindoos and Malays. The same phenomenon can be seen today, when every obscure, left-handed, Communist lesbian Jewess "poet" from Algeria is revered by British (and American) university professors who sneer at Shakespeare.

And let's not forget how Great Britain, out of sheer imperialistic pettiness, many times prevented Czarist Russia from storming Constantinople and freeing Balkanese Christians from a Turkish yoke for good!


The term of "jingoism," for stupid, short-sighted petty-patriotism was born in 1876, when Russians, outraged by the massacres of their Orthodox Bulgarian brethren by Turks, threatened to attack, and British, idiotic traitors-to-Christendom British, were outraged that Russia dared to reach for "their" Constantinople!


The origin of the term "jingoism":

"Exactly a century later, during the Russo-Turkish war, Russia was threatening to capture Constantinople. George Hunt, a prolific writer of music-hall songs, composed a topical song for the actor and singer Gilbert Macdermot (real name Gilbert Farrell), who was then performing regularly at the London Pavilion under the stage name of The Great Macdermot. The song immediately became a hit, especially the first four lines of its refrain:

We don’t want to fight
but by jingo if we do...
We’ve got the ships, we’ve got the men,
and got the money too!

This was taken up by what we would now call the hawks of the London public, who had for some time been after the Russians’ blood. The Daily News first called them jingoes in its issue of 11 March 1878; a subscriber wrote to the paper two days later about “The Jingoes—the new type of music-hall patriots who sing the Jingo song.”

http://www.worldwidewords.org/weirdwords/ww-jin1.htm



You can see from Dostoevsky's "Writer's Diary," written at this time, how outraged Russians were that Britons sided with the enemies of Christendom against them in such a blatant manner.


Petr