Or had they bit off more than they could chew?

1940-41: If they'd had better long-range fighters and bombers, and hadn't switched to night bombing of British cities, they could have weakened the RAF enough to possibly envade Britain. However, the question of whether the Kriegsmarine would have been up to it remains.

1941: If Hitler had allowed his generals to plan the invasion of Russia better, eg less optimistic, more winter clothing, etc, the Germans would have stood a better chance in Russia. If Hitler had not split the thrust, dilly-dallyed before finally deciding to attack Moscow, etc, the Germans would have stood a much better chance. Attacking Russia on the levels of knowledge, equipment, etc they did was a mistake.

42-43: If Hitler had not foolishly sent forces into Stalingrad instead of trying to surround the city, the 6th Army wouldn't have been lost.

43: If Hitler had not decided on forcing a battle at Kursk, or failing that had allowed the battle to begin earlier instead of waiting for more new tanks, things might have gone better.

44: Forcing units to hold on to the Kursk pocket was moronic. Wacht Am Rhein was moronic. Etc.

45: Not surrendering to the Western Allies earlier was completely idiotic. By this point Hitler had no connection with reality whatsoever.


Hitler also didn't pick allies well. Italy contributed dick diddly zip squat nada bupkis, while pulling German forces into North Africa (it is interesting to note that another reason German forces lost in Africa was that the Germans did not adequately understand the importance of hygeine in the desert-burying feces, etc). Japan contributed even less, and Hitler declared war on the US after Pearl Harbour, which gained him nothing.

Sinclair the armchair Fieldmarshall using the proverbial hinsight to decide what he has no clue about. Thanks, next please...

Could Germany have won, it depends on what a victory constituted. If you mean by could Germany have conquered all of Europe, that was impossible after Stalingrad. If victory meant stopping the allies and holding unto some territory to preserve the Reich for a forseeable future, yes that was possible up untill March 1945, when the Allies moved over the Rhine.

I think his main mistake was declaring war on the USA without consulting his admiralty. The U Boot fleet wasn't nearly large enough at that moment, had he sunk a few trooptransports fast he might have been able to at least delay the landing in Normandy.

Germany could have won, had it been decided to:

1) Rationalize, and thus triple, war production earlier rather than later.

2) Continue development of the FW 187 "Falke" for production as a peerless long-range, high-speed interceptor and fighter-bomber.

2) Persist in the destruction of British airfields (making use of the invulnerable-to-interception Fw 187), rather than turning to reciprocal terror bombing, in order to pursue Seeloewe to success.

3) Optimize the Enigma machine by using single rather than dual cables on the stecker board, thus making it invulnerable to decryption.

5) Arm the Pzkw III with the available 50mm L/60 Kampfwagenkanone, as ordered by Hitler, facilitating the destruction of otherwise nearly invulnerable T-34's in the autumn of '41.

4) Not declare war on the U.S. and thus delay the entry of FDR's Judeo-Communist regime.

5) Assure supplies of nickel (Finland) and chrome (Turkey) ore in sufficient quantity for turbojet engine development and production (which were delayed by the necessity for development of substitute and consequently inferior materials).

6) *Massively* enhance the interceptor capability of the Reich (with jets and rockets) so as to survive the fanatically internecine onslaught of the atom-bomb-armed Judeo-Communists.

I think his main mistake was declaring war on the USA without consulting his admiralty. The U Boot fleet wasn't nearly large enough at that moment, had he sunk a few trooptransports fast he might have been able to at least delay the landing in Normandy.

The fact, to the contrary, is that Grand Admiral Raeder nagged Hitler toward a declaration in response to the provocations in the Atlantic ordered by the mendacious Judeo-Communist tyrant, FDR.

Raeder put it to Hitler as a question as to "whether it is consistent with the honor of a sovereign nation to allow this to continue without declaration of war". FDR's servant, Admiral Stark, prostitute chief of Atlantic operations, conceded that the Germans were fully justified in a declaration, given the acts of war committed by the regime.

Sinclair the armchair Fieldmarshall using the proverbial hinsight to decide what he has no clue about. Thanks, next please...

The topic is "Could Germany have won WWII?" OF COURSE THERE'S GOING TO BE FUCKING HINDSIGHT. What else should there be?

And gee, I guess I must have no clue at all about something I have large amounts of money tied up in books about..... I mean, gee, being informed about how the war went has *no connection at all* to what might have been done differently.

And why the fuck you need to make snide comments about my posts and my knowledge, when I have never gone after you personally, escapes me.

I'm not the one who includes "Don Ebus" and remarks about your ethnic background in every response to your posts.

Germany was did not have the resources or the time to prepare for a war on the scale that she waged it , within the time scale of 33 -39. ( Prior to invasion of Poland).

At Any time.
To be able to win in 1940 , would mean having the tools to fight beyond mainland Europe and to have prevented the evacuation from Dunkirk of the BEF.
The means to fight beyond mainland europe would have to mean more ocean going submarines to tighten the blockade and S-Boats to operate against shipping in British Coastal waters.
Had the BEF been trapped in France and a naval blockade been enforced with sufficent resources its hard to see GB being able to hold out alone.

1941. Again sufficent submarines and the means to sustain them at sea for prolonged patrols.
Invading Russia , having an end goal to work towards rather than a vague and unobtainable line in the region of the Urals.
The resources to invade Russia were lacking , and the appraisal of Red Army strength and Russian industrial out put was discounted.
Had Stalin been offered a peace package , in late 41 he would have taken it.
Generous terms favourable to Germany could have been obtained.
This option could have been explored up until 1942 if not 43.

After summer 42 its difficult to see an extention of the war in the east bringing anything but problems , to have sought and concluded a peace deal would have seemed reasonable.

Post 42 manstein wanted to go on the defensive and extract an increasingly high loss rate from the Russians let them do the attacking and have superior german Forces destroy them , through superior tactics and local superiority.
This might have erroded Russian resolve and made a settlement a possible out come.
Straight victory was increasingly unlikely and some settlement was the only chance Germany had .

As far as war with America goes , if GB had been defeated totally in 1940 America might never have come in direct conflict with Germany.

As it turned out the kreigsmarine was glad to have the gloves off but right away had one hand tied behind its back when Hitler against all advice and protests from Donitz sent submarines to Norway and to the Med. leaving him a mere 6 long range boats to operate along the American east Coast.

Germany even as the war progressed did have some opportunities to take different directions but failed to do so .
Not wishing to join the "blame Hitler for it all club" it has to be said the the ideology of the German Goverment ,the unrealistic demands of the Fuhrer and his interference with and inability to take sound advice did hasten defeat and allowed chances to avoid it slip through the fingers.

A settlement with Russia in 1942 , and a more realistic use of forces in the summer of 1942 would have given Germany a life line.
stalin could have been settled with and the losses of 42 , 43 could have been avoided.

There wouldn't have even been a War, if the treacherous Italians had kept their word and lived up to the steel-pact.
The Italian ambassador to London told the Brits, that Italy was in now way prepared, nor willing to fight for German interests on their side.
The French knew this and allthough they were reluctant to go to War for Danzig, they were convinced by the Brits, that it would be a cakewalk, because France would not have to fight a two-front War, because Italy would not join.
Had the Italians from the very begining taken a loyal and tough stance, with their fleet "threatening" French and British posetions in the mediterean and allowing Germany to use its bases against the French, France would never have declared War because of Danzig. And without France, Britain would never have alone declared War on Germany.

Not to mention their attack on Greece, opening a new Front, forcing us to help them out and scattering our resources. Even after the defeat of France, we would have been much better off with a neutral, friendly Italy. No Greece, No Africa, no Italy Front.

There wouldn't have even been a War, if the treacherous Italians had kept their word and lived up to the steel-pact.


Wasn't Germany required to notify Italy about their negotiations with the USSR? According to Shirer Italy wasn't even notified until August 22, 1939 that any treaty was in the works (signed August 23). I think that pissed off the Comando Supremo as much as anything else. Here's a copy of the document:

http://www.adolfhitler.ws/lib/proc/pactsteel.html

Don't you think Article III was violated?


The Italian ambassador to London told the Brits, that Italy was in now way prepared, nor willing to fight for German interests on their side. The French knew this and allthough they were reluctant to go to War for Danzig, they were convinced by the Brits, that it would be a cakewalk, because France would not have to fight a two-front War, because Italy would not join.


Wouldn't surprise me, but I don't see how any rational person could figure that Italy was ready to do much of anything. Of course, this is the French we're discussing here. :p

Germany was did not have the resources or the time to prepare for a war on the scale that she waged it, within the time scale of 33 -39. ( Prior to invasion of Poland).

Speer tripled war production at no increase in raw material usage and claimed that Hitler could thus have had three times the Wehrmacht in '39. The obvious failure to increase possible aircraft production in timely fashion, for which Udet was blamed, illustrates the point.

One German commentator observed that the German forces always seemed to be just 10% short of the material they needed to tip the balance of combat in their favor. And many of the significant German failures (deceived by British Doublecross system, Bismarck located and reacquired by British forces and sunk, Rommel's vital supply ships sunk, Kursk, the Battle of the Atlantic, deceived regarding the Normandy invasion, destruction of Army Group Center) were largely attributable to the failure to optimize the Enigma machine in a simple and obvious fashion.

1940-41: If they'd had better long-range fighters and bombers, and hadn't switched to night bombing of British cities, they could have weakened the RAF enough to possibly envade Britain. However, the question of whether the Kriegsmarine would have been up to it remains.



The British were replacing their losses in the BoB quicker than the Germans were. They also had plans to move their fighter squadrons to Wales which was out of range of the Luftwaffe. It would've lessened the RAF's time over London but at least they would've been able to making a showing.

It's believed that Germany couldn't have invaded the UK. They just couldn't ferry enough troops at a time and supplies would've been a bitch.

This would have meant that the changes would have to been implemented prior to 39 and in good enough time to make a difference.
I do see your point as illustrated in my answer . e.g the need to have had more submarines and surface craft especially those which could operate in the Channel and seriously disrupt coastal traffic.
Manpower might have posed a problem and to make the most of time the country would have to been seriously on a war footing prior to 38.
Oil would always have been a problem waiting to happen , the more engines you have to feed the greater the consumption.
I still don't think Germany would have been able to meet all the demands made by the services.
( I do take your point regarding aircraft production and would put the pityful production of submarines forward as a major error even more so that that of aircraft production , the few numbers of VII's on station in 39-41 was crazy and totally enadequate , add to this the torpedo problems and a major chance of success was lost).
The counter balance is that an even more intense effort would have been met with equal activity in France and GB , which may have cancelled some of the increased production out.
The enigma / ultra information was vital but it alone would not assure victory , it certainly did help.
With the start they had on enigma its probable that in time it would have been caught up with. A good part of the code breaking was due to poor disicipline in the use of and the over use of the system.
Luftwaffe codes in particular proved easy to break into.
Even with in the limitations of what Germany went to war with it was an extremely close run race which could as you say so easily have gone in Germany's favour.
That extra 10% might have made a difference had the direction on its use been better applied .
Had BEF been removed from the picture Halifax's hand would have been strengtened , certaqinly 40-41saw Germany's only real chance of victory at sea.
Bismracks re-location was down to the radio message sent by Lutjens , it gave his position away and with the complete enigma package having been captured from Lemp's U-110 any wiring system would have been exposed and from then on in any alternative wiring would have meant nothing.
Captures from weather ships (Krebs) proved vital in that the whole enigma hardware was in British hands.
The British policy of aquiring this equipment was very successful , no code is completely secure , and Donitz did ask if it had been compromised , he was told no.
The article of faith , eg this code cannot be broken was a major failing.

I've read and seen on documentaries that Germany's industrial orders took months to get through all the red tape and filter to the factories, etc.

This meant that if they believed they would lose 120 Bf 109s in July they would set it in motion to produce enough to replace them months in advance. Then if July turned up and they lost 400 it would take months for them to get around to replacing them.

The Allies would just up production on the spot.

complete enigma package having been captured from Lemp's U-110 any wiring system would have been exposed and from then on in any alternative wiring would have meant nothing.
Captures from weather ships (Krebs) proved vital in that the whole enigma hardware was in British hands.
The British policy of aquiring this equipment was very successful , no code is completely secure , and Donitz did ask if it had been compromised , he was told no.
The article of faith , eg this code cannot be broken was a major failing.

The Allies in North Africa were getting Rommel's orders sometimes hours before he did.

The Luftwaffe was really bad at properly decoding their messages too apparently.

This would have meant that the changes would have to been implemented prior to '39 and in good enough time to make a difference.
Correct - and the best job in this regard was not done because Hitler was goofing off and leaving the organization of rearmament largely to Goering, who self-admittedly didn't know what he was doing. Hitler was relaxed in hoping and expecting that the British would see reason as Hitler saw it in mutually supportive alliance, and he refused to accept that the Russians were capable of the military re-industrialization (of which they were not, in fact, without the infusions of Western technology and administrative guidance of which the Germans were unaware and would have been disbelieving regarding the racial/cultural/ideological treason involved) which produced the overwhelming masses of tanks and aircraft with which the German forces had to contend.

Manpower might have posed a problem and to make the most of time the country would have to [have] been seriously on a war footing prior to '38.
Also true - but a lot of the regimented labor devoted to public works could have been devoted to war production.

Oil would always have been a problem waiting to happen, the more engines you have to feed the greater the consumption.
Excellent point - the Germans would have been in a race to get as far as they could before oil became an issue - hence the necessity for having the most capable equipment at hand, the 50mm Pak 38 and the equivalent Kwk on the Pzkw III (APCR rounds just sufficiently penetrative of contemporary heavy armor), plus the FW 187 (50 mph faster than the single-engined fighters), to avoid delays imposed by facing Russian heavy armor and the Spitfire.

I still don't think Germany would have been able to meet all the demands made by the services.
But they could have had enough material to pursue all campaigns to the establishment of defensible positions.

The counter balance is that an even more intense effort would have been met with equal activity in France and GB , which may have cancelled some of the increased production out.
Possibly so, but remember that the Germans staged an elaborate pre-war deception suggesting that they had many more aircraft than in fact they had, with only the result in terms of Anglo-French production that history records. Had the merely apparent German numbers been a matter of actual fact, the Germans would have been at a very decisive numerical advantage, given the reaction that, in fact, occurred.

The enigma / ultra information was vital but it alone would not assure victory , it certainly did help. With the start they had on enigma it's probable that in time it would have been caught up with. A good part of the code-breaking was due to poor discipline in the use of and the over-use of the system. Luftwaffe codes in particular proved easy to break into.
Enigma, properly optimized with *single* stecker cables, would have been invulnerable to any decryption technique prior to the introduction of computers far more powerful than the "Colossus" used to break into the Geheimschreiber at the end of the war. This can be seen from analysing the machine itself and is the testimony of Gordon Welchman (*The Hut Six Story*), who devised the 'diagonal board' addition to Turing's 'Bombe' which exploited the fatally-flawed *double* steckering of the Enigma plug board

Bismarck's re-location was down to the radio message sent by Lutjens, it gave his position away and with the complete Enigma package having been captured from Lemp's U-110 any wiring system would have been exposed and from then on any alternative wiring would have meant nothing. Captures from weather ships (Krebs) proved vital in that the whole Enigma hardware was in British hands.
I must disagree that having a properly-configured Enigma in the hands of the Allies would have compromised the instrument. A single-steckered plug board would have allowed a daily reconfiguration of the wiring which would have placed the replication possibilities at an order of magnitude so far beyond that betrayed by the 'cribs' being used against the double-steckered machine that only computers which appeared many years later could have broken in within a useful time framework. Even German *misuse* of the machine would not have compromised it.

Neo Nietzsche,
Some good points regarding the 189 dropped by RLM , looked it up in Smith & Kay certainly seems to have been a good aircraft relegated to the scrap heap.
Do you think Willi M. had the ear of Goring ? Seems that a number of decent aircraft got less consideration than those put forward by Messerschmidt ?

I will have to read up more on the Enigma board you mention , thanks for drawing it to my attention.
So complete were the captures from Kerbs and U-110 and given the genius that Turning was I would think that given time they would have made in roads.
I wonder that in the couter intelligence game would the Bletchley Park lot have been looking at possible developments of enigma to try and second guess what options might be available to make the system more secure ?

I had thought that the labour force from public works might have been better used , having suggest this in a thread of fade's ( think it was about the building works of Speer / Hitler) , but I think this would have been vetoed by Hitler. The skill level of the work force might have been an issue .

The Russian , give them credit did produce some surprises, on the aircraft front , home grown products like IL-2 and the later model Yak /Lat. fighters which.
They did achieve some major relocation of factories and works beyond German reach which were in themselves a major achievement.

The old Russian scortched earth policy employed against The Grande Armee and against Germany might have denied them any use of captured oil fields.
The middle east always offerreed a better option than a more risky war with Russia.

The Bism arck sinking , the search pattern flown by the Catalinas out of Castle Archdale is said to have been based on an educated guess by Slessor given that her course indicated she was heading for a Biscay port.
Enigma ceratinly did contribute to the sinking of all her support vessels, something which must have made the kreigsmarine wonder " just what the hell is going on" , "luck" does not happen on such a scale.

The need to have developed a stronger submarine force would have been cruical if a war at sea was to have taken seriously , the " big ship" might have appealed to Hitler initially in terms of prestiege and national esteem but in the long run it served little purpose.
The likes of Alantis , Orion , etc proved more worthwhile in the long run.
Bismarck in a bisacy port would have just been one more ship which would have top have run the channel in "Cerberus".

We have in the course of the exchanges run more into the "what if area" .
Given the limitations of germanys production up to 39 and her use of materials from the Czechs. , the opportunity to win was still there.
I would say again that had BEF been captured , GB would have had little let to fight with by way of manpower and that which might have been fielded would have been green and inexperienced.
1940 presented the best chance to defeat GB. had Dunkirk been a failure , and had the army been allowed to manage the war in Russia and local population groups not have been mistreated a peace treaty could have been made to Germany's advantage with Russia.
Thanks for the tip on the Enigma , will certainly try and read up on it.
Cheers.

Neo Nietzsche,
Some good points regarding the 189 dropped by RLM , looked it up in Smith & Kay certainly seems to have been a good aircraft relegated to the scrap heap.
Do you think Willi M. had the ear of Goring ? Seems that a number of decent aircraft got less consideration than those put forward by Messerschmidt ?
For those interested, a brief account and photo of the Fw187:

http://members.tripod.com/Air_Museum_ww2/id34.htm

Hitler was impressed at a demonstration, but the RLM feeling seems to have been that horizontal maneuverability was a paramount consideration (Udet's influence?) and that two engines per primary fighter was one too many, given the shortage of the Daimler-Benz 600 series. Also, the general bias was in favor of armor and armament, rather than speed a' la the Mosquito, hence the choice of the Me 110 as the official Zerstorer. The Mosquito lesson was learned too late. It can't be said that Goering favored M. over Tank, at least, since G. was very enthused about the FW 190 and wanted this "zweite Eisen im Feuer" turned out like so many "hot rolls".

So complete were the captures from Kerbs and U-110 and, given the genius that Turing was, I would think that given time they would have made in-roads. I wonder that in the counter-intelligence game would the Bletchley Park lot have been looking at possible developments of Enigma to try and second guess what options might be available to make the system more secure?
Yes, BP was always trying to anticipate the Germans, but the technology of the time granted the advantage to Scherbius-principle rotor machines over decryption capability - the American 'Sigaba' machine, more thoughtfully optimized, having been made invulnerable to decryption.

The Russians, give them credit did produce some surprises, on the aircraft front, home-grown products like IL-2 and the later model Yak /Lat. fighters. They did achieve some major relocation of factories and works beyond German reach which were in themselves a major achievement.
Factories and works which the megacidal Bolshevik anarchist regime would not have had but for the treason of elements in the West.

We have in the course of the exchanges run more into the "what if area". Given the limitations of Germany's production up to '39 and her use of materials from the Czechs, the opportunity to win was still there. I would say again that had BEF been captured, GB would have had little left to fight with by way of manpower and that which might have been fielded would have been green and inexperienced. 1940 presented the best chance to defeat GB. Had Dunkirk been a failure, and had the Army been allowed to manage the war in Russia and local population groups not have been mistreated, a peace treaty could have been made to Germany's advantage with Russia.
Thanks for the tip on the Enigma, will certainly try and read up on it.
Cheers.
Good summary.

The book I was looking at mentioned that the 189 was used as a test project for the development of the Ta154 project.
At a glance she resembles the HE-129.
Will try and make time to read what I have on "enigma" , the book you mentioned " Hut 6" , might take a look for it.
The view on Willi M. was my own and to be honest its something which has formed over a period of time , Kurt Tank's 190 being a particular favorite aircraft.
Another " what if " , had the 190 been Germany's main fighter in 1940 , "the sh!t would really have hit the fan"
http://www.chez.com/franckruffino/
http://www.luftwaffe.cz/index.html

Above are quite good , in particular the site on Knoke , his diary I read way way back finding the site was refreshing.
Thanks for the link.