http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/104-3/fm.htm

*CMH Pub 104-3
NIGHT COMBAT

*This publication replaces DA Pam 20-236, June 1953.
Facsimile Edition, 1982, 1986

Center of Military History United States Army Washington, D.C.

FOREWORD


The material for this study was prepared for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a group of former German generals and general staff officers. The principal author, former Brig. Gen. Alfred Toppe, and most of his associates served for extended periods on the Russian Front during World War II. Moreover, most of them held assignments involving troop training.

The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view, and that the procedures, tables of organization and equipment, combat doctrine, and staff methods of the German Army differed widely from those of the U.S. Army. It is interesting to note, however, that, in conformity with the German recommendations made in this study, our own programs are placing increasing emphasis on night combat training.

Final editing of this study was done in the Foreign Studies Branch, Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. The draft translation of the original German text was first revised and then reorganized in the interest of brevity, clarity, and pertinence. In this process every effort was made to retain the point of view, the expressions, and even the prejudices of the authors.

A. C. SMITH
Major General, USA
Chief, Military History

CONTENTS

Page
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF NIGHT COMBAT
I. General 4
II. Physical and Psychological Factors 4
III. Exercise of Command 5
IV. Orientation 6
V. Reconnaissance 6
VI. Security 7
VII. Movements 7
VIII. Assembly 8
IX. Attack 9
X. Pursuit 12
XI. Defense 13
XII. Retrograde Movements 15
XIII. Position Warfare 16
CHAPTER 3. RUSSIAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS
I. Characteristics and Training of the Russian Soldier 19
II. Movements 20
III. Reconnaissance 21
IV. Infiltration 22
V. Offensive Operations 27
VI. Defensive Operations 29
VII. Retrograde Movements 30
VIII. Partisan Warfare 30
CHAPTER 4. GERMAN NIGHT COMBAT METHODS
I. Movements 32
II. Reconnaissance 33
III. Offensive Operations 33
IV. Defensive Operations 37
V. Retrograde Movements 38
CHAPTER 5. TRAINING
I. General 42
II. Individual Training 43
III. Weapons Training 44
IV. Unit Training 44
APPENDICES Training Schedules 46
I. Eight Week Night Training Schedule for Tank Company
II. Twelve Week Night Training Schedule for Armored Infantry Troops
III. Eight Week Night Training Schedule for Antitank Elements
IV. Ten Week Training Schedule for Close Combat at Night
V. Eight Week Night Training Schedule for Organic Engineer Elements Within the Tank or Self-propeled Antitank Gun Battalion 47
VI. Eight Week Training Schedule for Organic Engineer Elements Within the Armored Infantry Regiment 48
VII. Eight Week Night Training for the Engineer Platoon of an Armored Reconnaissance Battalion 49

v
MAPS

No. Page
1. General Reference Map vi
2. The Region around Shala 23
3. Russian Infiltration by Night (17-21 August 1943) 25
4. German Preparations for a Night Attack (30 September-2 October 1941) 35
5. German Surprise Attack by Night (21 January 1944) 36
6. German Night Withdrawal (25-27 September 1943) 40

I like this :)


. Characteristics and Training of the Russian Soldier

In World War II, as in preceding wars, the Russian soldier demonstrated that he was closer to nature than his west European counterpart. This was hardly surprising since most of the Russian soldiers were born and raised far from big cities. The civilian occupation of the typical Russian soldier was that of a farmer, lumberjack, or huntsman. From early childhood he had been used to covering long distances across difficult terrain, orienting himself by conspicuous features on the ground, by the stars, and often simply by following his natural instincts. The manifold dangers that were ever present in the wide-open Russian countryside were bound to sharpen his senses, particularly his sight and hearing. Even the city dwellers, most of whom had only recently been transplanted to the densely populated cities as part of the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the resulting concentration of labor masses, remained relatively close to nature. Being attuned to the vast open spaces and desolate steppes with which a large part of his country is covered, the Russian did not know the depressing loneliness and forlornness that often overwhelmed the German soldier. The Russian was accustomed to getting along with a minimum of comfort and equipment under climatic conditions that imposed severe hardship on the invader.

The Russian was able to move without a sound and orient himself in the darkness. On a night patrol he instinctively behaved like a huntsman who is careful to avoid making the slightest noise. During long night vigils the German sentries, on the other hand, often saw no harm in conversing or lighting a cigarette or pipe just to lessen their drowsiness. When reporting to a superior who was checking their post, they spoke in a loud voice without realizing that they often permitted the intently listening Russian who was hiding in the immediate vicinity to gather valuable information. When their not-too-keen ears picked up a suspicious sound. German sentries often fired Very pistols, thus giving away their position to the enemy. Since the Germans were in the habit of posting sentries at the same place night after night over periods of several weeks or even months, Russian agents who were watching the sentries perform their routine, duties were able to infiltrate the German lines without danger to themselves. In contrast to the stereotype way in which the Germans posted their guards at night, the Russians changed the location of their posts constantly.

The Russian soldier performed particularly well as a night observer. Stern discipline and self-constraint enabled him to lie motionless for hours and observe the German troops at close range without being detected. He waited patiently for the most favorable opportunity to carry out his mission.

Russian junior officers were accustomed to act in accordance with rigid orders. Upon encountering unexpected resistance they were easily confused and, in the event of a surprise counterattack against the flank of their unit, often helpless.

In general, Russian night combat training was adapted to the terrain conditions and the characteristics of the average soldier. The exigencies of war led to an intensification of the training with emphasis on trickery, cunning, and deception rather than orthodox tactical doctrine and independent imaginative thinking.

Quite a bit of the stuff prepared for the US military after the war by German officers is available in the book "Fighting in Hell".

Some of the stuff seems a bit "exaggerated" though. Too much emphasis on the "special abilities" of the Russian soldier, in lieu of talking about how the defeat in WWII was due to inferiority of supplies and some strategic mistakes by the German high command.

I would still be placing my money on The Luftwaffe.
Like Sinclair says quite a piece of intelligence work was prepared by Ex-German Soldiers , Sailors and Airmen to gleam as much as possible about the Russian , how he fought and how to fight against him.
The average Russian " Ivan" was tough and was accustomed to getting by on very little.
You have to think that the Russian political system with all its fears and back watching may have something to do with junior oficers only doing what they are told taking little account of what was going on around them.
Certainly the way Germany's army was directed had much to do with her defeat , much of the direction taken coming from the supreme commander himself.

the Russian tank commanders were **** compared to the german tank commanders. The russian's only had a few hours of experience in their tank, if they were lucky (also related to the great purges).
The only reason the Russians were able to win is because they produced 50.000 t-34's which were superior on the battlefield

The Russian Front in WWII had more examples of Russian victories due to German mistakes, Hitler's meddling, or Russian superiority of men and materiel, than Russian victories due to superior generalship.

The Russians had some good generals, but the Germans had more "star" generals, and far better quality of men of all categories overall up until near the end.

Germany in common with Gb was running out of experienced men officers and nco's in particular from 43 onwards.
Certainly better trained , more flexible in mind and better led than the Russians.
The old elephant and ants tale , the elephant may kill thousands of the ants , but sooner or later the ants will get the upper hand and kill the elephant.
Russian Ants killed the German Elephant.
I think Heydrich certainly helped or had a hand in Stalin's belief that a purge would be in his own best interests.