Gromovnik
08-02-2004, 04:08 PM
http://www.kakarigi.net/croatia/news/dossier/eng/
The decision is made
When President Tudjman returned from Brijuni to Zagreb on the August 3rd it was clear that the decision has been made. News from Geneva confirmed earlier estimations that the rebel Serbs leaders are not taking seriously the situation and determination of Croatian state politics to finally end rebellion and secession. Looking back on that Thursday a few significant things crop up. International situation was particularly favorable for Croatia. Americans were furious at Serbs for running over Srebrenica and Zepa. They tacitly considered that Croats could offer the fastest and most efficient aid to Bihac. Croatian army was rapidly mobilizing reserve forces. In addition to 80 000 soldiers and officers further 70 000 were mobilized (Croatian Home Guard of the 2nd echelon) and 50 000 more in the third echelon. There was not a town or urban area not participating in major defense operation. All together 200 000 combat troops were ready for the action. 25 fully equipped brigades stood at the positions facing the rebel area.
Zagreb will go all the way
Well-informed analysts figured out that it was not restricted action this time. Zagreb would go all the way regardless of the warnings its allies gave saying resistance of the rebel army would be strong or even unbeatable. Germans believed Croatian military intervention to be unavoidable. American intelligence expected Croats to succeed if they would be able to bring the operation to the end within 7 to 10 days having own losses
around 1000 dead and wounded. Noone assumed that secret plan "Storm '95" was planned even to be faster. Continuos demoralization of rebel Serbs that could not even be stopped by a professional soldier general Mile Mrk{i} is taken into account. He received his instructions from Belgrade to reorganize "krajina" defense and make it more flexible. Tactical and strategic estimations were placed on the desk of Croatian president 10 days before the operation started. The conclusion was unanimous: Serbia won't intervene for the reasons of inner instability (including the political-ideological conflict with Radovan Karadjic and Milan Martic) and in order to fulfill Milosevic's ambitions of getting economic sanctions lifted by the beginning of October. President Tudjman wanted everything to be checked out once again. Before signing the order for the operation he raises four important questions: major aims of the attack, a way to achieve them, situation among Croatian troops and the update of the situation in the enemy's army. "Storm '95" carefully looked into all scenarios. Minister of defense Gojko Susak and military and intelligence top people of Croatian army learned that the rebel troops represent mosaic of mutually incoherent military formation expected to breakdown within 5 to 7 days. According to the available data president Tudjman expected the breakdown to come even sooner, especially having in mind the psychological moment when rebels realize Belgrade abandoned them.
http://www.kakarigi.net/croatia/news/dossier/eng/text1.jpg
On the eve of the "Storm"
In all Croatian preparations it was taken into account that the intention towards the rebels couldn't be hidden because of the mass mobilization throughout Croatia so the surprise factor won't be forthcoming as in all the earlier operations. But it wasn't the aggravating circumstance. On the contrary the public demonstration of the military concentration was the additional psychological pressure onto rebels who were using their armed formations all the time as the means that should dissuade Croatian of making more serious attack. Even before Geneva, Knin was partially agitated.
Declaring state of war rebel leaders were making efforts to strengthen their formations and to gather 50 000 men (5 000 to 10 000 were the best age group and 20 000 were younger or older. Rebel military leadership estimated that Croatian major strike directions would be Banija, Kordun and Lika in order to break a siege of Bihac. Because of that fact so called 15th, 21st and 39th corps got additional reservists and two thirds of heavy arms were thrown over and concentrated at the triangle Petrinja - ways to Karlovac - Glina. Seventh corps and less heavy arms were left to protect Knin and "northern Dalmatia" which wasn't enough (Croatian were evidently accumulating its troops around Zadar, Sibenik and Sinj, actions from the Grahovo region, permanent endangering of Strmica to open direct way to Knin and so on). Although threatening signals from Zagreb were increasing on the eve of the "Storm" rebel leaders decided once again they could count on the fast military support of Bosnian Serbs (air force and 10 000 men) and Milan Martic was persistently explaining that Belgrade won't be passive this time. Although nervous Serbian negotiators from Geneva sent the message that Croatian attack is completely certain, general Mrksic considered that his basic force of 37 000 men is enough to confront Croatian offensive and to resist further 10 days. 17 000 men of so called "army of the republic of Serb krajina" in eastern Slavonija should immediately start actions on the front line and with strategy of retaliation put pressure onto Osijek and Vinkovci what should force Croats to transfer part of their reserve forces to the eastern front thus giving the relief to the defense of the northern parts of "krajina".
http://www.kakarigi.net/croatia/news/dossier/eng/text2.jpg
The dawn Serbs will remember
In the evening of August 3rd, detonator of the conflict was inevitably ticking off last moments. Wick that was set on fire by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to explode in Croatia. It seemed as nothing was going on along the 700 km long front line at 3 a.m. of the August 4th. But, 2 000 Croatian cannons , howitzers, mortars rocket launchers and recoilless canonns were ready to fire. An hour later, UN peace forces in Croatia were officially informed that unavoidable military and police operation would start, with purpose of reestablishing constitution, law and order in sectors North and South. Anyway nothing happened in the next 60 minutes that would disturb hot and moistly dawn. And then, exactly at 5 a.m. the artillery strike like none seen before started. Serbs will remember that dawn very well. They were encouraging themselves day by day: no retreat, no surrender. Our forts will be our bloody shirts. They did not expect that so much steel will fall over their heads immediately. Although they knew Croats were superior, their propaganda claimed that krajina fighters are not afraid of Croatian slings. At the same moment all the way from north to the south the command echoed: Fire! Roar of Croatian artillery broke the morning silence waking up sleepy Serbian quasyrepublic. Salvos were following one another all in all 40 minutes with no stops, somewhere even longer. In the Serbian pillboxes, forts, barracks, commands, storehouses, reserve positions, quickly digged trenches, on the approaches of all bigger cities there was panic with everyone shouting: Croats are coming . . . they are braking through from everywhere. Terrified men in the forts were hit by bouncing rocks, wood and deafened by noise. Dust and smoke were choking surprised garrisons. The cannon and rocket launcher fire were joined by a fire of Croatian tanks and sounds of Croatian infantry arms, who started unstoppable breakthrough through thinned mine fields and chopped barb wire. In Serbian lines, where many were totally stunned by the noise of explosions, they didn't know what to do next. In only ten hours of fighting Serbs suffered mentally and started to fall apart. Instead of fortified north Croats tightened the circle around Knin that trembled from the shell detonations which were destroying military targets. In four days of major operations Croatian armed force demonstrated they are ready, with methodical and continuos pressure of their formations, to surround completely rebel "krajina" as a kindled almond which suddenly found itself in the nut cracking pincers. Objections that too much force had been used are absurd. In the liberation war exaggerated force is only the sufficient force.
http://www.kakarigi.net/croatia/news/dossier/eng/hrva1.jpg
The decision is made
When President Tudjman returned from Brijuni to Zagreb on the August 3rd it was clear that the decision has been made. News from Geneva confirmed earlier estimations that the rebel Serbs leaders are not taking seriously the situation and determination of Croatian state politics to finally end rebellion and secession. Looking back on that Thursday a few significant things crop up. International situation was particularly favorable for Croatia. Americans were furious at Serbs for running over Srebrenica and Zepa. They tacitly considered that Croats could offer the fastest and most efficient aid to Bihac. Croatian army was rapidly mobilizing reserve forces. In addition to 80 000 soldiers and officers further 70 000 were mobilized (Croatian Home Guard of the 2nd echelon) and 50 000 more in the third echelon. There was not a town or urban area not participating in major defense operation. All together 200 000 combat troops were ready for the action. 25 fully equipped brigades stood at the positions facing the rebel area.
Zagreb will go all the way
Well-informed analysts figured out that it was not restricted action this time. Zagreb would go all the way regardless of the warnings its allies gave saying resistance of the rebel army would be strong or even unbeatable. Germans believed Croatian military intervention to be unavoidable. American intelligence expected Croats to succeed if they would be able to bring the operation to the end within 7 to 10 days having own losses
around 1000 dead and wounded. Noone assumed that secret plan "Storm '95" was planned even to be faster. Continuos demoralization of rebel Serbs that could not even be stopped by a professional soldier general Mile Mrk{i} is taken into account. He received his instructions from Belgrade to reorganize "krajina" defense and make it more flexible. Tactical and strategic estimations were placed on the desk of Croatian president 10 days before the operation started. The conclusion was unanimous: Serbia won't intervene for the reasons of inner instability (including the political-ideological conflict with Radovan Karadjic and Milan Martic) and in order to fulfill Milosevic's ambitions of getting economic sanctions lifted by the beginning of October. President Tudjman wanted everything to be checked out once again. Before signing the order for the operation he raises four important questions: major aims of the attack, a way to achieve them, situation among Croatian troops and the update of the situation in the enemy's army. "Storm '95" carefully looked into all scenarios. Minister of defense Gojko Susak and military and intelligence top people of Croatian army learned that the rebel troops represent mosaic of mutually incoherent military formation expected to breakdown within 5 to 7 days. According to the available data president Tudjman expected the breakdown to come even sooner, especially having in mind the psychological moment when rebels realize Belgrade abandoned them.
http://www.kakarigi.net/croatia/news/dossier/eng/text1.jpg
On the eve of the "Storm"
In all Croatian preparations it was taken into account that the intention towards the rebels couldn't be hidden because of the mass mobilization throughout Croatia so the surprise factor won't be forthcoming as in all the earlier operations. But it wasn't the aggravating circumstance. On the contrary the public demonstration of the military concentration was the additional psychological pressure onto rebels who were using their armed formations all the time as the means that should dissuade Croatian of making more serious attack. Even before Geneva, Knin was partially agitated.
Declaring state of war rebel leaders were making efforts to strengthen their formations and to gather 50 000 men (5 000 to 10 000 were the best age group and 20 000 were younger or older. Rebel military leadership estimated that Croatian major strike directions would be Banija, Kordun and Lika in order to break a siege of Bihac. Because of that fact so called 15th, 21st and 39th corps got additional reservists and two thirds of heavy arms were thrown over and concentrated at the triangle Petrinja - ways to Karlovac - Glina. Seventh corps and less heavy arms were left to protect Knin and "northern Dalmatia" which wasn't enough (Croatian were evidently accumulating its troops around Zadar, Sibenik and Sinj, actions from the Grahovo region, permanent endangering of Strmica to open direct way to Knin and so on). Although threatening signals from Zagreb were increasing on the eve of the "Storm" rebel leaders decided once again they could count on the fast military support of Bosnian Serbs (air force and 10 000 men) and Milan Martic was persistently explaining that Belgrade won't be passive this time. Although nervous Serbian negotiators from Geneva sent the message that Croatian attack is completely certain, general Mrksic considered that his basic force of 37 000 men is enough to confront Croatian offensive and to resist further 10 days. 17 000 men of so called "army of the republic of Serb krajina" in eastern Slavonija should immediately start actions on the front line and with strategy of retaliation put pressure onto Osijek and Vinkovci what should force Croats to transfer part of their reserve forces to the eastern front thus giving the relief to the defense of the northern parts of "krajina".
http://www.kakarigi.net/croatia/news/dossier/eng/text2.jpg
The dawn Serbs will remember
In the evening of August 3rd, detonator of the conflict was inevitably ticking off last moments. Wick that was set on fire by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to explode in Croatia. It seemed as nothing was going on along the 700 km long front line at 3 a.m. of the August 4th. But, 2 000 Croatian cannons , howitzers, mortars rocket launchers and recoilless canonns were ready to fire. An hour later, UN peace forces in Croatia were officially informed that unavoidable military and police operation would start, with purpose of reestablishing constitution, law and order in sectors North and South. Anyway nothing happened in the next 60 minutes that would disturb hot and moistly dawn. And then, exactly at 5 a.m. the artillery strike like none seen before started. Serbs will remember that dawn very well. They were encouraging themselves day by day: no retreat, no surrender. Our forts will be our bloody shirts. They did not expect that so much steel will fall over their heads immediately. Although they knew Croats were superior, their propaganda claimed that krajina fighters are not afraid of Croatian slings. At the same moment all the way from north to the south the command echoed: Fire! Roar of Croatian artillery broke the morning silence waking up sleepy Serbian quasyrepublic. Salvos were following one another all in all 40 minutes with no stops, somewhere even longer. In the Serbian pillboxes, forts, barracks, commands, storehouses, reserve positions, quickly digged trenches, on the approaches of all bigger cities there was panic with everyone shouting: Croats are coming . . . they are braking through from everywhere. Terrified men in the forts were hit by bouncing rocks, wood and deafened by noise. Dust and smoke were choking surprised garrisons. The cannon and rocket launcher fire were joined by a fire of Croatian tanks and sounds of Croatian infantry arms, who started unstoppable breakthrough through thinned mine fields and chopped barb wire. In Serbian lines, where many were totally stunned by the noise of explosions, they didn't know what to do next. In only ten hours of fighting Serbs suffered mentally and started to fall apart. Instead of fortified north Croats tightened the circle around Knin that trembled from the shell detonations which were destroying military targets. In four days of major operations Croatian armed force demonstrated they are ready, with methodical and continuos pressure of their formations, to surround completely rebel "krajina" as a kindled almond which suddenly found itself in the nut cracking pincers. Objections that too much force had been used are absurd. In the liberation war exaggerated force is only the sufficient force.
http://www.kakarigi.net/croatia/news/dossier/eng/hrva1.jpg