The battleship Bismarck deserves the attention of all serious historians, for she was the primary protagonist of one of the most dramatic episodes of World War II. Bismarck's shining adventure in the Atlantic marked one of the few times during World War II that a sole battleship attempted to maintain its traditional role as king of the seas, and the ship's tragic fate served as a death knell for an era that stretched back to the 1850s. The days of big guns and stout armour gave way to aircraft, torpedoes, and bombs. Yet for a brief but intense service period the Bismarck was the largest, most powerful, and for many, the most beautiful warship afloat. Unlike her sister-ship Tirpitz, or the Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi, which were all sunk without the opportunity to engage enemy battleships, the Bismarck fought valiantly against a far superior enemy, and was eventually defeated in one of the most astonishing battles ever waged. As in the days of old, the ship dueled the British battle cruiser Hood and her consort, the battleship Prince of Wales. Six minutes later the Hood was torn in half by a devastating magazine explosion, and the Prince of Wales was forced to break away. But it was not merely the world-wide publicity after sinking the Mighty Hood that earned Bismarck a place in history. It was also the enormous amount of human and material resources utilized for hunting down and destroying this modern leviathan.


Hundreds of books, magazines, and publications of all kinds have been written about this formidable warship in different languages, and except for the Titanic, no other vessel has been as much discussed as the Bismarck. Even today, more than 60 years later, the battleship's unique story continues to draw the attention of thousands of young people throughout the world, and it has become a classic in naval literature.
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OPERATION RHEINÜBUNG

Following the success achieved by the surface ships in the Atlantic during the winter of 1940-1941, the German Naval High Command decided to launch a much more ambitious operation. The idea was to send a powerful battle group comprised of the battleships Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau into the Atlantic to attack Allied merchant shipping. The latter two battleships were in Brest, in occupied France, since 22 March. They had just completed a successful campaign of two months in the North Atlantic under the command of the Fleet Chief, Admiral Günther Lütjens, in which they sank or captured 22 ships with a total tonnage of 116,000 tons. Unfortunately, the Scharnhorst had to enter dry dock in order to undergo machinery repairs and would be unavailable at least until June. In the Baltic, the Bismarck had almost finished her trials and would soon be ready for her first war cruise. However, the Tirpitz, which had only recently been commissioned on 25 February, had not yet completed trials, and it was unlikely that she would be available in the spring.

On 2 April, the same day the Bismarck received her last two Arado 196 aircraft, the High Command outlined the strategy to follow in its operation's order (B.Nr. 1. Skl. I Op. 410/41 Gkdos Chefs.). With the Scharnhorst in dry dock and the Tirpitz not ready for action yet, it was decided that Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen would be sent into the North Atlantic in late April under the command of the Fleet Chief. The Gneisenau would later sail from Brest to join them. The mission of the German ships was to attack convoys operating in the Atlantic north of the Equator. Because of the success of the German warships in recent months, the Allied convoys had improved their protection and were now strongly escorted by either battleships or cruisers. So, it would be Bismarck’s duty to engage the escorts while the other ships attacked the merchant vessels virtually unopposed.

The British Admiralty was concerned and had serious indications that the Germans were planning a large surface operation in the Atlantic. The British knew of Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau's presence in Brest and the danger they posed should they sortie in conjunction with Bismarck. Therefore, they decided to immobilize these two German battleships through air raids. On 6 April, a Coastal Command Beaufort plane (Lieutenant Kenneth Campbell) of the 22º Squadron scored a torpedo hit on Gneisenau's stern. Although the British aircraft was shot down by the anti-aircraft batteries, Gneisenau was damaged and had to enter dry dock for repairs. A few days later, during the night of 10/11 April, the battleship was hit again. This time by four bombs dropped by the RAF, and this forced to lengthen the repair work for months. As a result of these attacks, the German force was reduced to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, which would be the only warships available to participate in attacks on enemy merchant shipping that spring.

There were more than enough reasons to cancel the operation until a larger force could be assembled. By autumn, the Tirpitz would be worked up and the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Brest would be ready again. Also the short spring nights made it more difficult for the German ships to reach the Atlantic undetected. Despite this, the idea to send the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen to the Atlantic in the spring remained a viable one. The United Kingdom was in a critical situation for supplies, and five months of "relative calm" at sea would have only strengthened her position. There was also the increasing fear that the United States would join the war, resulting in greater detection capabilities, and thus, reducing to a considerable extent the movements of the German fleet. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder thought it more important to utilise Bismarck's potential and keep up the pressure on the British supply lines, and, therefore, he decided to go on with the operation. The most important task was that the two German ships could reach the Atlantic unnoticed. From there, they could get lost in the immensity of the ocean and attack enemy convoys at will.

In the meantime, Admiral Lütjens had met the U-boat Chief, Vice-Admiral Karl Dönitz, in Paris on 8 April. Both Admirals knew each other well as they had worked together on several occasions before the war. At that conference they outlined the U-boat support that was to be given to the Bismarck. The U-boats would carry on as usual in their normal positions, but if any opportunity arose for a combined action with Bismarck, it would be fully exploited. A U-boat liaison officer was therefore assigned to the Bismarck.

On 22 April, Admiral Lütjens established the details of the operation now code-named Rheinübung (Rhine Exercise). The departure of the German ships was imminent, but on 23 April the Prinz Eugen was damaged by a magnetic mine while en route to Kiel. This required repair work which delayed the operation for some time. Three days later, on 26 April, Lütjens and Raeder met in Berlin to discuss the situation. The Fleet Chief suggested to Raeder the possibility of postponing the operation until the Scharnhorst and/or Tirpitz would be ready. The Grand Admiral, however, thought it was imperative to resume the Battle of the Atlantic as soon as possible and ordered the operation to go forward.

Meanwhile, aboard the Bismarck, everything was reaching a level of maximum readiness. In late April, two new 2 cm Flak C/38 quadruple mounts were installed on both sides of the foremast above the searchlight platform. On 28 April, Captain Lindemann informed the Naval High Command (OKM), Group North, Group West, and the Fleet Command that the Bismarck was personnel-wise and materiel-wise fully ready for action, and provisioned for three months. He noted in the ship’s war diary:
“The first phase in the ship’s life since the commissioning on 24 August 1940, is successfully completed. The goal was reached after eight months, being over the target date by only fourteen days; although the original intention (Easter) was missed by a forced waiting period in Hamburg (24.1–6.3.1941) of six weeks, due to the closing of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and by ice jams.
The crew can be proud of this accomplishment. It was accomplished, because there was an overall common desire to engage the enemy as soon as possible. I, therefore, had no qualms to make extremely high demands on them for a prolonged period of time, and because the ship and his equipment had been totally spared, despite of hard use and very Spartan lay-up time, from extensive breakdowns and damage.
The state of training that has been reached, compares favourably with that of a capital ship’s readiness for a full [scale] battle inspection in the good years of peacetime. Although the crew, with few exceptions, completely lacks real combat experience, I have the calm feeling that all forthcoming combat demands will be readily dealt with. This feeling is strengthened by the fact that the combat value of this ship, by virtue of the achieved state of training, awakens great confidence in every man so that - for the first time in a long time – we can feel at least equal against any opponent.
The delay of our deployment, whose approximate time could not be kept hidden from the crew, is a tough disappointment for all involved.
I will use the waiting period in the previous manner, for the further perfection of training, but also to provide somewhat more rest for the crew. Furthermore, I intend to devote more time to division duties and the outer maintenance of the ship, since both of these duties necessarily had to take on very minor role. In addition, I will replenish weekly the expended stores of the three months requisition requirements.”

On 5 May, Hitler visited Gotenhafen (today Gdynia) to inspect both the Bismarck anchored in the roadstead, and the Tirpitz at the pier in the harbour. Raeder was absent, and Lütjens received the Führer, but he didn't inform him about the upcoming sortie of his ships.

On 13 May, Admiral Lütjens and the Fleet Staff embarked in the Bismarck and then the ship spent the whole afternoon in the Bay of Danzig conducting refuelling exercises with the Prinz Eugen. On the next day, during the course of other exercises, this time with the light cruiser Leipzig, Bismarck’s 12-ton portside crane was disabled. The departure of the Bismarck was, therefore, once again delayed in order to repair the crane. Finally on 16 May, Lütjens informed the High Command that the ships were ready, and the date for the beginning of Operation Rheinübung was established as 18 May.
Bismarck's Departure.


At 1000 on the morning of 18 May 1941 in Gotenhafen, Admiral Lütjens inspected Prinz Eugen's crew. Afterwards, a conference was held on board the Bismarck, where the Admiral briefed the operative plan to the two ships' commanders, Captains Ernst Lindemann and Helmuth Brinkmann. It was decided that if the weather proved favourable, they would not stop in the Korsfjord (today Krossfjord). They would, instead, sail north to refuel from the Weissenburg before cruising into the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland.

At noon, the Bismarck left the berth under the tunes of Muß i' denn played by the fleet band, and then she anchored in Gotenhafen's roadstead to take on supplies and fuel. Operation Rheinübung had begun. While refuelling in the roadstead, one of the fuel-oil hoses broke and Bismarck could not be refuelled to her full capacity. It was nothing significant, although the battleship was loaded with approximately 200 tons less of fuel. At about 2100, the Prinz Eugen weighed anchor. Bismarck followed suit at 0200 in the early morning of 19 May. Both ships sailed independently until they joined together off Rügen Island at noon on 19 May. It was then that Captain Lindemann informed Bismarck's crew by loudspeaker that they were going into the North Atlantic to attack British shipping for a period of several months. After this, the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen sailed west escorted by the destroyers Z-23 (Commander Friedrich Böhme) and Z-16 Friedrich Eckoldt (Commander Alfred Schemmel). At 2230, the destroyer Z-10 Hans Lody (Commander Werner Pfeiffer) with the Chief of the 6th Flotilla (Commander Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs) on board, joined the formation. During the night of 19/20 May the German ships passed through the Great Belt, which remained closed to merchant ships, and then reached the Kattegat in the morning of 20 May.

On 20 May, while in the Kattegat, the German battle group was sighted by numerous Danish and Swedish fishing boats. The weather was clear, and at 1300, the German ships were sighted by the Swedish cruiser Gotland (Captain Agren) which reported the sighting to Stockholm. Lütjens assumed this ship would report his position, and at 1737 radioed this incident to Group North, the German Naval command station based in Wilhelmshaven then under the command of Generaladmiral Rolf Carls. The Swedish had reported the sighting and then it was leaked to the British Naval Attaché, Captain Henry W. Denham. Later in the day, from the British embassy in Stockholm, Denham transmitted the following message to the Admiralty in London:
"Kattegat, today 20 May. At 1500, two large warships, escorted by three destroyers, five ships and ten or twelve planes, passed Marstrand to the northeast. 2058/20."
Meanwhile, at 1615 in the afternoon, the 5th Minesweeping Flotilla (Lieutenant-Commander Rudolf Lell) joined the German battle group temporarily to help the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen pass through the minefields that blocked the entrance to the Kattegat. At dusk on 20 May, the German ships were already getting out of the Skagerrak near Kristiansand. They were then sighted from the coast by Viggo Axelseen, of the Norwegian resistance, who duly reported the sighting to the British in London. During the night of 20/21 May the Germans headed north.
Early on 21 May, the British Admiralty received the sighting report from Denham, and aircraft were instructed to be on the alert for the German force. At about 0900, the German ships entered the Korsfjord south of Bergen with clear weather. Admiral Lütjens had wanted to continue to the north without stopping in Norway, but because of the clear weather he decided to enter the Korsfjord and continue the voyage that night under cover of darkness. At noon, the Bismarck anchored in the Grimstadfjord at 250-500 meters off the nearest shore. The Prinz Eugen headed north with the three destroyers and anchored in Kalvanes Bay. As a measure of precaution two merchant ships were laid along both sides of Prinz Eugen as torpedo shields.
Meanwhile, at 1100 on 21 May, the British Coastal Command had dispatched an Spitfire (Lieutenant Michael Suckling) from Scotland to look for the German ships. At 1315, the Spitfire successfully sighted and photographed the German ships in the Korsfjord from an altitude of 8,000 meters (26,200 feet), and then returned to Scotland where it landed at Wick Airfield at about 1415. The sighting of the German battle group by the Swedish cruiser Gotland in the Kattegat as well as by Norwegian resistance operatives the previous day, had proven very unfortunate for the Germans. If the German group would have passed through the Kiel Canal instead, this may have possibly prevented such immediate sightings, and thus the Coastal Command sending the Spitfire. Unfortunately, it took two full days to transit the canal and it was not considered a viable option by the German command.
During their brief stay in the Korsfjord, the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen painted over their striped camouflage paint with outboard grey. In addition, the Prinz Eugen with less than 2,500 mt of fuel oil left in her tanks refuelled from tanker Wollin. The Bismarck did not refuel and this would later prove to be a mistake. It seems that refuelling the Bismarck was not scheduled, and that Prinz Eugen was refuelled only because she absolutely had to be due to her shorter endurance. By 1700, the Prinz Eugen completed refuelling, and at 1930, the German ships weighted anchor. At this time, Bismarck's intelligence team received a message from Germany, in which, based on an intercepted radio message, British aircraft had been instructed to be on the alert for two battleships and three destroyers proceeding on a northerly course. Around 2000, just before night fall, the five German ships left the Norwegian fiord, and after separating from the coastline, set a course of 0º at 2340, due North.

Upon receipt of the first sighting reports, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Home Fleet, Admiral Sir John Cronyn Tovey, immediately began to consider the possible intentions of the German warships. He ordered the heavy cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk, both under the command of Rear-Admiral William Frederick Wake-Walker, to patrol the Denmark Strait. Later in the afternoon, the photos taken by the Spitfire arrived, thus positively identifying one Bismarck class battleship and one Hipper class cruiser in Bergen. Therefore, shortly before midnight on 21 May, the battlecruiser Hood flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Lancelot Ernest Holland, the battleship Prince of Wales, and the destroyers Achates, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Electra, and Icarus, left Scapa Flow for Hvalfjord in Iceland. Their mission to cover the access points south and east of Iceland.

To the Denmark Strait.


On 22 May, the weather worsened. During the night, the German battle group headed North, with the three destroyers in the lead and the Prinz Eugen closing the formation. At 0420, the destroyers were detached and headed east to Trondheim, while the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen maintained their northward course at 24 knots. At 1237 there was a submarine and air alarm, and the German ships zig-zagged for about half an hour. When the alarm ended, the tops of the main and secondary turrets were painted over, and the swastikas on the decks were covered with canvas, as they could help enemy aircraft to identify the German ships. Afterwards, the group set a northwest course to the Denmark Strait. It was cloudy the entire day and the fog was so thick that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had to switch on their searchlights from time to time in order to maintain contact and keep position. The weather conditions were therefore very favourable for the German ships to pass through the Denmark Strait and reach the Atlantic unnoticed.
Meanwhile, at 2000 on 22 May, Admiral Tovey received news that the German warships had departed Norway. He then left Scapa Flow with the battleship King George V, the aircraft carrier Victorious, the light cruisers Kenya, Galatea, Aurora, Neptune, Hermione, and the destroyers Active, Inglefield, Intrepid, Lance, Punjabi and Windsor. The battlecruiser Repulse, sailing from the Clyde was to join them later the next morning.

That night of 22/23 May, after receiving the report, Winston Churchill cabled to president Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Yesterday, twenty-first, Bismarck, Prinz Eugen and eight merchant ships located in Bergen. Low clouds prevented air attack. Tonight [we discovered] they have sailed. We have reason to believe that a formidable Atlantic raid is intended. Should we fail to catch them going out your Navy should surely be able to mark them down for us. King George V, Prince of Wales, Hood, Repulse and aircraft carrier Victorious, with auxiliary vessels will be on their track. Give us the news and we will finish the job."

On 23 May the weather remained the same. At 1811 in the afternoon, the Germans sighted ships to starboard, but soon realised they were actually icebergs which were common in those latitudes. Meanwhile, the battle group reached the ice limit, and set a course of 240º. At 1922, the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were sighted by the British heavy cruiser Suffolk at a distance of seven miles. The Suffolk sent an enemy report: "One battleship, one cruiser in sight bearing 020º, distance 7 miles, course 240º." The Germans had detected the British cruiser as well, but were unable to engage the enemy because the Suffolk took cover in the fog. About an hour later, at 2030, the Germans sighted the British heavy cruiser Norfolk, and this time the Bismarck opened fire immediately. She fired five salvos, three of which straddled the Royal Navy ship throwing some splinters on board. The Norfolk was not hit by any direct impact, but had to launch a smoke screen and retire into the fog. The British cruisers then took up positions astern of the German ships; the Suffolk (equipped with a new Type 284 radar) on the starboard quarter, and the Norfolk (with an old Type 286M radar) on the port quarter. Both ships would keep R. D/F (radio direction-finding) contact and report the Germans’ position until more powerful British ships could engage.

On board the Bismarck the forward radar instrument (FuMO 23) had been disabled by the blast of the forward turrets. Because of this, Admiral Lütjens ordered his ships to exchange positions and the Prinz Eugen with her radar sets (FuMO 27) intact took the lead. Bismarck’s powerful artillery would serve to keep the British cruisers from coming any closer. This change would produce great confusion for the British the next morning.

After being sighted by cruisers Suffolk and Norfolk, Lütjens could have then turned around and head for the Norwegian Sea in order to refuel from tanker Weissenburg. He had already done this earlier that year when in command of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau his force was detected by the British cruiser Naiad in the Faeroes-Iceland gap. An early retreat at this point would have forced the four British capital ships (Hood, Prince of Wales, King George V and Repulse) that had already put to sea, to go back to Scapa Flow with a considerable expenditure of fuel. This time however, Lütjens continued towards the Atlantic with the hope of shaking off the British cruisers at night. The weather conditions in the Denmark Strait were favourable to do so. When Lütjens decided to press on, it is probably because he believed that the heavy units of the Home Fleet were too far away to intercept him, and that they may still be in Scapa Flow. The German reconnaissance reports seemed to confirm this, although the truth is that Vice-Admiral Holland's force was already approaching the area at high speed. Another thing Lütjens did not count on was the effective use of British radars. At about 2200, the Bismarck reversed her course trying to catch the Suffolk, but the British cruiser withdrew maintaining the distance. Therefore, the Bismarck returned to the formation behind the Prinz Eugen.


The Battle of the Denmark Strait.


The Battle of the Denmark Strait, also known as the Iceland Battle, was a brief naval engagement of little more than a quarter of an hour. It was a clash of titans in which the largest warships in the world were put to the test, and it will be remembered as a battle that ended in the sinking of a mythic ship.

In the early morning of 24 May, the weather improved and the visibility increased. The German battle group maintained a course of 220º and a speed of 28 knots, when at 0525, the Prinz Eugen's hydrophones detected propeller noises of two ships on her port side. At 0537 the Germans sighted what they first thought to be a light cruiser at about 19 miles (35,190 meters / 38,480 yards) on port side. At 0543, another unidentified unit was sighted to port, and thereafter the alarm was given aboard the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Aboard the Bismarck the identification of the enemy ships was uncertain, and they were now both mistakenly thought to be heavy cruisers. Correct identification at this time was vital in order to choose the right type of shells. Prinz Eugen's First Artillery Officer (I.A.O.), Lieutenant-Commander Paulus Jasper, also believed the approaching ships to be cruisers and ordered to load 20.3cm high explosive shells (Spgr. L/4,7). At this point, the British warships (in reality the battlecruiser Hood and the battleship Prince of Wales) were approaching the German battle group on a course of 280º at 28 knots. Vice-Admiral Holland, aboard the Hood, familiar with the vulnerability of his battlecruiser in long range combat, was probably trying to get closer quickly before opening fire. Admiral Lütjens did not have any other choice but to accept the combat. Due to the similar silhouettes of the German ships, at 0549 Holland ordered his ships to both engage the leading German ship (the Prinz Eugen) believing she was the Bismarck. After this, the British ships made a 20º turn to starboard on a new course of 300º. At 0552, just before opening fire, Holland correctly identified the Bismarck at last, and ordered his force to shift target to the right-hand ship, but for some reason Hood kept tracking the leading ship. Aboard the Prince of Wales, however, they correctly targeted the Bismarck which followed in Prinz Eugen's wake a mile or so behind. Suddenly, at 0552.5, and from a distance of about 12.5 miles (23,150 meters / 25,330 yards), the Hood opened fire, followed by the Prince of Wales half a minute later at 0553. Both ships opened fire with their forward turrets, since their after turrets could not be brought to bear due to the ships' unfavourable angle of approach. Admiral Lütjens immediately signalled to Group North: "Am in a fight with two heavy units". The first salvo from Prince of Wales landed over and astern of Bismarck. Afterwards, Prince of Wales started suffering the first of many mechanical problems, as "A" turret's no. 1 gun broke down temporarily and could not fire anymore. Her second, third and fourth salvoes fell over Bismarck. Hood's first two salvoes fell short from Prinz Eugen throwing some splinters and much water on board.


Jot Dora! The Bismarck Opens Fire.


The British shells were already landing close, but the German guns still remained silent. Aboard the Bismarck, the First Artillery Officer (I.A.O.), Lieutenant-Commander Adalbert Schneider, in the foretop command post, requested several times permission to open fire without reply from the bridge. Finally at 0555, while Holland's force was turning 20º to port (a manoeuvre that now permitted Bismarck to identify correctly the Hood and a battleship of the King George V Class), the Bismarck opened fire, followed by the Prinz Eugen immediately afterwards.1 The distance at this time was around 11 miles (20,300 meters / 22,200 yards). Both German ships concentrated their fire on the foremost right opponent, the Hood. Bismarck's first salvo landed short. Aboard the Prinz Eugen, the port 53.3 cm torpedo tubes had already been trained towards the enemy and Captain Brinkmann ordered the Torpedo Officer, Lieutenant Reimann: "permission to fire as soon as in reaching range". At 0556, Prince of Wales' fifth salvo fell over again, but the sixth straddled and likely hit the Bismarck even though aboard the British battleship no hits were observed. The initial fire of the Germans had been excellent, and at 0557, the Prinz Eugen had already obtained a hit on Hood's shelter deck near the mainmast. This caused a big fire which spread as far as the second funnel. The Bismarck had also been hit, and was now leaving a broad track of oil upon the surface of the sea. Therefore, Lütjens ordered the Prinz Eugen (that had already fired six salvoes on Hood) to change target towards the Prince of Wales, together with the secondary battery of the Bismarck which had just entered in action.


The Destruction of the Hood


At 0600, the Hood and the Prince of Wales were in the process of turning another 20º to port in order to bring their after turrets into action, when Bismarck's fifth salvo hit the Hood. The distance was less than 9 miles (16,668 meters / 18,236 yards). At least one 15-inch shell penetrated Hood's armour belt and reached an after magazine where it exploded. The German observers were awestruck by the enormous explosion. The Hood, the Mighty Hood, pride of the Royal Navy and during 20 years the largest warship in the world, split in two and sank in three minutes at about 63º 22' North, 32º 17' West. The stern portion sank first, end up and centre down, followed by the bow portion, stem up centre down. It happened so fast that there was not even time to abandon the ship. Out of a crew of 1,418 men, only three survived. Vice-Admiral Holland and his fleet staff, the commander of the Hood Captain Ralph Kerr, and everyone else perished. The three survivors were rescued after three and a half hours at sea by the destroyer Electra (Commander Cecil Wakeford May), and later landed in Reykjavik.2
After the Hood blew up, the Bismarck turned to starboard and concentrated her fire on the Prince of Wales. The British battleship had since altered her course to avoid the wreck of the Hood, and this placed her between the sinking battle cruiser and the German ships. The Germans were thus presented with an easy target switch. At 0602, the Bismarck hit Prince of Wales' bridge, killing everybody there, except the commander, Captain John Catterall Leach and another man. The distance had decreased to 14,000 meters (15,310 yards), and now even the 10.5cm heavy anti-aircraft battery on Prinz Eugen (on Bismarck probably too) entered in action. The Prince of Wales was at a clear disadvantage, and at 0603 launched a smoke screen and retreated from the combat after being hit a total of four times by the Bismarck and three more by the Prinz Eugen. The British battleship fired three more salvoes with "Y" turret under local control while retreating, but did not obtain any hits. At 0609 the Germans fired their last salvo and the battle ended. For the British, this must have been incredible, the German ships kept the same course instead of following the damaged Prince of Wales and finishing her off.The Prinz Eugen was not hit during the battle and remained undamaged, even though some Hood's shells landed close by in the opening phase of the engagement and fragments landed on board. However, the Bismarck had been hit on the port side by three heavy shells probably from the Prince of Wales. The first shell hit Bismarck amidships below the waterline in section XIV, passed through the outer hull just below the main belt, and exploded against the 45-mm armoured torpedo bulkhead. This hit caused the flooding of the port electric plant No. 4. The adjacent No. 2 boiler room also took some water, but this was contained by the damage control parties through the use of hammocks. The second shell hit the bow in section XXI, just above the waterline. This projectile entered the port side, passed through the ship above the armoured deck without exploding, and exited the starboard side leaving a hole of 1.5 meters in diameter. Around 2,000 tons of salt water got into the forecastle, and as a consequence of this 1,000 tons of fuel oil were blocked there. The third shell simply passed through a boat without any appreciable damage at all.

As a result of these hits, the top speed of the Bismarck was reduced to 28 knots. The battleship was 3º down by the bow and had a 9º list to port. Because of this, the blades tips of the starboard propeller were out of the water at times. Therefore the starboard void tanks in sections II and III were flooded to reduce the bow trim and list. The damage was not especially serious, the Bismarck maintained intact her fighting capability, good speed, and there were no casualties among the crew; only five men had been slightly wounded. However, the loss of fuel was to affect the remaining course of action.

Lütjens Options.

After the battle in the Denmark Strait, the German ships continued on a south-western course. At this time Lütjens had two main options. The first was to return to Norway and the second to carry on into the North Atlantic. Today most people agree that, if at all possible, Lütjens should have destroyed or at least disabled the already damaged Prince of Wales, then turn around, and head for Trondheim, via the Denmark Strait. Lütjens could also have taken a shorter path to Bergen, via the Faeroes-Iceland passage, although the chances of being intercepted by Tovey's battle group (King George V, Repulse, and Victorious) coming from Scapa Flow were greater as well. Instead, the German Admiral opted not to pursue the Prince of Wales (apparently against Captain Lindemann's suggestions) and headed for the Atlantic. At 0801, Admiral Lütjens sent a series of messages to the Group North informing it of his intention to take Bismarck to Saint-Nazaire for repairs. The Prinz Eugen, which was undamaged, would stay in the Atlantic to attack enemy convoys on her own.

The decision to head for Saint-Nazaire shows that after a survey of the damage sustained, Lütjens had correctly decided to cancel Operation Rheinübung at least temporarily until the Bismarck could be repaired in port. But, why did he choose Saint-Nazaire? The French port was farther than Norway and it required greater fuel expenditure. Lütjens probably thought France was the best place to resume the battle of the Atlantic as soon as possible following Raeder's wishes. In fact, he had successfully entered Brest with Scharnhorst and Geneisenau a couple of months earlier.



At 0950, Captain Brinkmann was informed by semaphore of the damage received by Bismarck, and afterwards Lütjens ordered the Prinz Eugen to take up position aft of Bismarck temporarily in order to ascertain the severity of her oil loss. By 1100, the Prinz Eugen resumed her previous position in front of the battle group. The three British pursuing ships, now under command of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, were still shadowing the Germans; the Suffolk from the starboard quarter, and the Norfolk with Prince of Wales from the port quarter. At noon, the German command transferred the operative control of Operation Rheinübung from Group North to Group West, and at 1240 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen set a new course of 180º due south at 24 knots.

Dispositions made by the British Admiralty.


The unexpected sinking of the Hood caused enormous indignation in London, and the British Admiralty began to divert all available warships from their original missions in order to join in the chase for Bismarck. This included leaving most convoys that were at that time crossing the Atlantic unescorted.

The battleship Rodney (Captain Frederick H. G. Dalrymple-Hamilton) was at sea to the west of Ireland on her way to Boston for repairs with destroyers Somali, Tartar, Mashona, and Eskimo of the 6th Flotilla escorting the liner Britannic (27,759 tons), now used as a troop transport. The Admiralty ordered Rodney to operate against Bismarck and at 1036 on the 24th signalled: "If Britannic cannot keep up, leave her behind with 1 destroyer." Therefore Rodney and destroyers Tartar, Mashona and Somali left Britannic with destroyer Eskimo at noon. The battleship Ramillies (Captain Arthur D. Read) to the South of Cape Farewell was also instructed to leave the convoy she was escorting (HX-127) and "proceed so as to make contact with enemy from westwards, subsequently placing enemy between Ramillies and C.-in-C". In addition, the battleship Revenge (Captain Ernest R. Archer) in Halifax was ordered to put to sea, and she left port at 1500, then headed east.
The Prinz Eugen is Detached.


Early in the morning of 24 May, Admiral Lütjens had already decided to detach the Prinz Eugen, and at 1420 sent a semaphore signal to Captain Brinkmann:
«Intend to shake stalker as follows: During rain squall, the Bismarck will change course west. Prinz Eugen will maintain course and speed until he is forced to change position or three hours after the departure of Bismarck. Subsequently, is released to take on oil from "Belchen" or "Lothringen". Afterwards, pursue independent cruiser war. Implementation upon cue word, "Hood".»
This was to be a diversionary manoeuvre in which the Bismarck had to distract the British ships long enough to let the Prinz Eugen escape. Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Karl Dönitz had ordered the U-boat force a complete cessation of operations against merchant shipping in order to support the Bismarck. At this time Lütjens urged Dönitz on a radio telegram to assemble his U-boats in quadrant AJ 68. His intention was that Bismarck would be able to lead the British pursuing ships into a trap the next day. Therefore Dönitz stationed several U-boats (U-93, U-43, U-46, U-557, U-66, U-94) in the given area to the South of the southern tip of Greenland. At 1540, the German battle group entered a rain squall, and the execution order of "Hood" was given. The Bismarck turned to starboard at 28 knots, however the Suffolk was shadowing very close from the starboard quarter and the manoeuvre failed. Therefore, at 1600 the Bismarck resumed her position on Prinz Eugen's wake. Two hours later, at 1814, the Bismarck turned to starboard at high speed again. This time the manoeuvre was successful and the Prinz Eugen maintained her course and left the formation. The Bismarck closed on the Suffolk, and at 1830 opened fire from 18,000 meters (19,685 yards), but the cruiser quickly retired under a smoke screen. Subsequently, the Bismarck became engaged with the Prince of Wales at long distance, and after an exchange of shells the fire ceased at 1856. After this action, in which no hits were scored by either side, the Suffolk joined the Norfolk and the Prince of Wales back to the port side of the Bismarck, probably to avoid being surprised by the German battleship if she decided to reverse her course again. This left Bismarck’s starboard side open. The British would pay a high price for this manoeuvre a few hours later, but before this they would still have an opportunity to attack the Bismarck.

The fuel situation aboard Bismarck had become serious, and at 2056, Lütjens informed Group West that, due to fuel shortage, he was to proceed directly to Saint-Nazaire. In fact, at this time the Bismarck had less than 3,000 tons of fuel-oil available, and unless some of the 1,000 tons of fuel blocked under the forecastle could be retrieved, the battleship would be forced to slow down in order to reach the French coast. Had Bismarck been refuelled in Bergen on 21 May, now she would have some 1,000 tons more of additional fuel available. That would have given Bismarck more freedom of movement and would have enabled Lütjens to make a diversionary manoeuvre to try shake off his pursuers. But the reality was that the fuel shortage hampered the original idea to drive the pursuing British forces into the western U-boat screen, and it forced Bismarck to follow a steady course to France. As a result of this change of plans, all available U-boats in the Bay of Biscay were now ordered to form a patrol line to cover Bismarck's new expected course.


Attacked by Swordfish Torpedo Planes.

At 1509, Admiral Tovey had detached Rear-Admiral Alban Curteis (in Galatea) with the carrier Victorious (Captain Henry Cecil Bovell) and the four light cruisers Galatea, Aurora, Kenya and Hermione to close the range and deliver a torpedo attack. At 2210, some 120 miles from Bismarck, Victorious launched all her nine Swordfish torpedo planes of the 825th Squadron under the command of Lieutenant-Commander (A) Eugene Esmonde.4 At 2300, they were followed by three Fulmars of the 800Z Squadron, and at 0100 by two more to maintain touch. Esmonde obtained a surface contact on his ASV (anti-surface vessel) radar at 2350, and prepared his aircraft for the attack, but instead of Bismarck he found the US Coast Guard Cutter Modoc (Lieutenant-Commander Harold Belford). The Bismarck, only six miles away, spotted the British aircraft and opened fire immediately while increasing the speed to 27 knots.

One Swordfish lost contact with the rest of the squadron in a cloud layer, and only eight planes proceeded to attack around midnight. The German anti-aircraft fire was very intense and even the main and secondary batteries opened fire. Lindemann and the helmsman, Hans Hansen, operating the press buttons of the steering gear, successfully avoided the first six torpedoes when suddenly the battleship was hit. A 18 inch MK XII torpedo struck Bismarck's starboard side, amidships, at the level of the main belt which resisted the explosion very well. The damage was minimal, although the explosion caused the death of Oberbootsmann Kurt Kirchberg (who became the first casualty aboard) and injured six men.

Despite the heavy anti-aircraft fire none of the obsolete Swordfish were shot down, and by 0230, all of them had landed on the Victorious. However, the last two Fulmars that had been launched from Victorious were not so fortunate, and they were lost after they ran out of fuel and were forced to land in the sea. The crew of one of them was rescued later by the merchant ship Beaverhill.

After the Swordfish attack, the Bismarck reduced her speed to 16 knots to alleviate the pressure in the forecastle and carry out repairs. The distance between both forces decreased, and at 0131 on 25 May (Lütjens' 52th birthday), the Prince of Wales opened fire on Bismarck. The battleships exchanged two salvoes each at a range of 15,000 meters (16,400 yards), but due to the poor visibility neither side scored any hits. The morale aboard the Bismarck was high and sometime about then, the crew wished the Chief of Fleet a happy birthday by the ship's loudspeaker system


Admiral Lütjens Makes His Move.


All three British ships that were shadowing the Bismarck from the port quarter had begun to zig-zag in case of a possible U-boat attack. At 0306, taking advantage of the enemy’s disposition and the darkness, Lütjens saw his opportunity to break the contact with his pursuers. The Bismarck increased her speed to 27 knots and turned to starboard, in a manoeuvre very similar to the one executed the previous afternoon when the Prinz Eugen was detached. The Bismarck succeeded in breaking contact and established a new course of 130º due southeast, to Saint-Nazaire. The British ships tried in vain to re-establish contact with the Bismarck, and at 0401 the Suffolk reported: "Enemy contact lost."


Vice-Admiral Wake Walker's order to change the position of Suffolk in the previous afternoon (24 May) now had its consequences. It gave the Bismarck room to manoeuvre, and Lütjens did not waste this opportunity. With the Suffolk stationed on Bismarck's starboard quarter, it would have been much more difficult for the German battleship to break contact.

Nevertheless, on board the Bismarck they did not realize that the contact had been broken, and at 0700 Admiral Lütjens sent the following message to the Group West: "One battleship, two heavy cruisers keeping contact." At 0900, Lütjens sent another long message to the Group West. Neither message reached Group West until well after 0900. Ironically, Group West had previously sent (at 0846) a message confirming that the British had lost contact. After this, Bismarck kept strict radio silence, but the British had already intercepted her signals allowing them to calculate her approximate position.

At 1152, Lütjens received a personal message from Admiral Raeder: "Heartiest Birthday Wishes! In view of your recent great armed feat, may you be granted many more such successes [as you enter] a new year of your life!" Minutes later, at noon, Lütjens delivered the following speech to the crew by the loudspeakers:
"Soldiers of the battleship Bismarck! You have achieved great fame! The sinking of the battlecruiser Hood does not only have a military, but also a morale [psychological] value [significance], because Hood was England’s pride. The enemy will now attempt to gather its forces and deploy them toward us. Therefore, I released Prinz Eugen yesterday noon so that he can conduct his own war on merchant vessels. He has accomplished to evade the enemy. By contrast, because of the hits we have sustained, we have received the order to head for a French harbour. The enemy will gather on the way and will engage us in battle. The German Nation is with you [in spirit] and we will fire until the barrels glow and until the last projectile has exited the barrel. For us soldiers [the battle cry] as of now is: “Victory or death!”
At 1625, Lütjens received yet another message of congratulations, this time from Hitler: “I send to you today my very best congratulation for your Birthday!" That same afternoon, Bismarck's Chief Engineer, Lieutenant-Commander Walter Lehmann and several crewmen began to construct a dummy funnel. This would give the battleship two funnels and hopefully confuse the enemy, should Bismarck be detected again. During the night of 25/26 May, the Bismarck maintained her course and there were no incidents on board.



The Bismarck is Located.


In the morning of 26 May, as the Bismarck was approaching the French coast, the crew was ordered to repaint the top of the main and secondary turrets yellow. Hard job considering the state of the seas, nevertheless it was carried out although the yellow paint washed off at least once.

A few hours earlier, at 0300, two Coastal Command Catalina flying boats had taken off from Lough Erne in Northern Ireland on a reconnaissance mission in search for the Bismarck. At about 1010, Catalina Z of 209 Squadron commanded by Dennis Briggs sighted the German battleship that immediately answered with very accurate anti-aircraft fire.5 The Catalina jettisoned her four depth charges and took evasive action after her hull was holed by shrapnel. Then reported: "One battleship, bearing 240º, distance 5 miles, course 150º. My position 49º 33' North, 21º 47' West. Time of transmission 1030/26." After more than 31 hours since the contact was broken, the Bismarck had been located again. Unfortunately for the British, however, Admiral Tovey's ships were too far away from the German battleship. The King George V was 135 miles to the north, and the Rodney (with a top speed of 21 knots) was 125 miles to the northeast. They would never catch up with the Bismarck unless her speed could be seriously reduced.

Only the Force H, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir James F. Somerville, sailing from Gibraltar, had a chance to intercept Bismarck. The battlecruiser Renown (Captain Rhoderick R. McGriggor) was in the best position, but having lost the Hood only two days earlier, the Admiralty did not permit Renown to engage the Bismarck. The best hope for the British was to launch an air strike from the carrier Ark Royal. The Ark Royal had already launched 10 Swordfish at 0835 to try find the Bismarck, and once the report of the Catalina sighting arrived, the two closest Swordfish altered course to intercept. At 1114, Swordfish 2H located the German battleship too, followed seven minutes later by the 2F. Shortly afterwards two more Swordfish, fitted with long-range tanks, were launched to relieve 2H and 2F and keep touch with Bismarck.

At 1450, fifteen Swordfish commanded by Lieutenant-Commander J. A. Stewart-Moore took off from the Ark Royal (Captain Loben E. Maund) to attack the Bismarck. At 1550, they obtained radar contact with a ship and dived to attack. The attack, however, turned out to be a failure since the ship sighted was actually the light cruiser Sheffield (Captain Charles A. Larcom) which had been detached from Force H to make contact with the Bismarck. Luckily for the British, the Sheffield was not hit by any of the 11 torpedoes launched because they had faulty magnetic pistols. Two torpedoes exploded upon hitting the water, three on crossing the cruiser wake, and the other six were successfully avoided. The Swordfish returned to the Ark Royal and landed on her deck after 1700. At 1740, the Sheffield obtained visual contact with the Bismarck.

The British put every effort on one last attack. It would be dark soon, and they knew this was their last real chance to stop or at least slow down the Bismarck. If they failed again, the Bismarck would reach the French coast on the next day, since another air strike late at night was unlikely to succeed. Therefore, at 1915, another group comprised of fifteen Swordfish, mostly the same used in the previous attack, took off from the Ark Royal, and this time their torpedoes were armed with contact pistols.


Meanwhile, the pursuing British forces had run across U-556 (Lieutenant Herbert Wohlfarth) which sighted the Renown and the Ark Royal at 1948. The German submarine was perfectly placed for an attack, but could not do so as it had no torpedoes left. Wohlfarth had spent his last “fishes” on the ships of convoy HX-126 a few days back. Therefore, U-556 could only make signals reporting the position, course and speed of the enemy.

The Swordfish striking force, this time under the command of Lieutenant-Commander T.P. Coode, first approached the Sheffield to get the range and bearing to the Bismarck, and at 2047, began the attack. Bismarck's anti-aircraft battery opened fire immediately. During the course of the attack, the Bismarck received at least two torpedo hits. One torpedo (or two) hit the port side amidships, and another struck the stern in the starboard side. The first hit did not cause important damage, but the second jammed both rudders at 12º to port. The Bismarck made a circle and then began to steer northwest involuntarily into the wind. As before, none of the Swordfish were shot down although some were hit several times. The damage to the Bismarck was so serious that at 2140, Admiral Lütjens sent the following message to Group West: "Ship unable to manoeuvre. We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer".

The impact in the stern area caused the flooding of the steering and other adjacent compartments. This meant that all repair attempts would have to be done under water. Divers were ordered to enter the steering compartment in order to free the rudders, but the violent movement of the water inside made this an impossible task. It was not possible to lower divers over the side due to the high seas. As an alternative, it was considered to blow the rudders away with explosives and try to steer the ship using the propellers alone, but the idea was rejected fearing that the explosion could damage the propellers.

Destroyers Attack Bismarck.


After the aerial torpedo attack, the new erratic course of the Bismarck caused her to close the range with the Sheffield. At about 2145, Bismarck opened fire on the Sheffield at a range of about nine miles. Bismarck fired a total of six salvoes and the British cruiser turned away to the north under the cover of a smoke screen. The Sheffield was not hit, but some splinters disabled her radar and injured twelve men of whom three died later.6 The turn caused Sheffield to lose contact with Bismarck, but at 2200, she made contact with the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla (Captain Philip L. Vian) Cossack, Maori, Zulu, Sikh and Piorun, and provided them with the approximate bearing and distance to the German battleship.

At 2238, the Polish destroyer Piorun (Commander Eugeninsz Plawski) sighted the Bismarck. The German battleship responded shortly thereafter with three salvoes. The destroyers proceeded to attack, but Bismarck defended herself vigorously in the dark. At 2342, splinters knocked down Cossack's antennas. Shortly after 0000, star shells from the destroyers began to illuminate the area. About an hour later, a star shell fell on Bismarck's bows starting a fire there that had to be extinguished by some crew members. Throughout the night the destroyers attacked the German battleship. These attacks were carried out in heavy seas, rain squalls and low visibility, and no torpedo hits were obtained on Bismarck, that time after time repelled every attack with heavy and accurate fire from her main and secondary batteries. By 0700, a total of 16 torpedoes had been fired by the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla.



The Final Battle (A desperate fight against impossible odds).


The sea ran high with the wind from the north-west at force 8 (34-40 knots). On board the Bismarck, the atmosphere on the bridge was tense, and they knew it was only a matter of time before the British engaged them with heavy ships. The German battleship was steering against the wind at seven knots. The flooding in the stern compartments had somehow reduced the bow trim although the ship had a slight list to port. At 0833, King George V and Rodney altered their course to 110º, and ten minutes later at 0843, they sighted the Bismarck at 23,000 meters (25,150 yards).
The Rodney opened fire at 0847, followed by the King George V one minute later. The distance at this time was about 20,000 meters (21,870 yards). The Bismarck returned fire at 0849 with the forward turrets "Anton" and "Bruno" against the Rodney. At 0854, the Norfolk joined the battle with her eight 20.3cm guns, and at 0858 the secondary battery of Rodney joined the action.

At 0902, the Bismarck was hit by several shells that struck the forecastle, foremast and disabled the foretop rangefinder. At 0904, the Dorsetshire (Captain Benjamin C. S. Martin) which had just arrived, also opened fire. Two battleships and two heavy cruisers were firing against the Bismarck. At 0908, the forward rangefinder and turrets "Anton" and "Bruno" were put out of action. Bismarck's fire control was, therefore, shifted to the after command post. From there, the Fourth Artillery Officer (IV.A.O.), Lieutenant Müllenheim-Rechberg directed four salvoes against the King George V. But at about 0913, just as he got the range, his station was also put out of action by a 35.6cm shell that destroyed the cupola. The after turrets then proceeded to fire under local control at Rodney which, in the meantime, had launched six torpedoes at Bismarck, none of them hit. At 0921, turret "Dora" was put out of action after one of its own shells exploded inside the right barrel. At 0927, turret "Anton" or "Bruno" surprisingly fired one last salvo. Four minutes later, at 0931 turret "Cäsar" fired its last salvo. Only a few secondary guns were still in action, but these were soon to be silenced, too, by the enormous avalanche of British fire. At this time, Captain Lindemann, gave the order to scuttle and abandon ship.

Once the Bismarck lost her fighting capability, Rodney got closer, and from distances between 2,500 and 4,000 meters continued firing with her nine 40.6cm guns against the German battleship. The hits continued. At about 0940, the rear wall of turret "Bruno" blew out and the turret caught on fire. At 0956, the Rodney launched two more torpedoes from 2,700 meters with one possible hit scored on the portside. From this point blank range it was virtually impossible to miss a shot, and shell by shell hit the Bismarck which amazingly was still afloat. Soon after 1000, the Norfolk launched four torpedoes from about 3,600 meters with one possible hit to the starboard side. The destruction aboard the Bismarck was complete, and men had begun jumping overboard. All guns were out of action, their barrels pointing in different directions at odd angles. The funnel and superstructure were holed in many places. The port forward hangar was demolished. In some places the decks looked like a slaughterhouse. Ironically, the mainmast was still standing with the battle flag flaying with the wind. The Rodney ceased fire at 1016, and Tovey, short of fuel, was forced to leave the battlefield.



The Sinking of the Bismarck.

At 0920, the Ark Royal had launched twelve Swordfish in order to attack Bismarck. The Swordfish striking force appeared on the scene at about 1015, but due to the heavy fire from the British warships stayed away. At first, the King George V mistook them by German aircraft, and even opened fire with her anti-aircraft battery, but fortunately no planes were hit. At 1020, the Dorsetshire closed the range and fired two 21 inch MK VII torpedoes from 3,000 meters at the starboard side of the Bismarck. Both of them hit, but no appreciable effect was observed. Then, the British heavy cruiser turned around, and at 1036 fired another torpedo from 2,200 meters against Bismarck's port side that also hit. The Swordfish circling over the area were privileged witnesses to this unfolding drama. By this time the German battleship had a heavy list to port, with the water reaching the upper deck. The port secondary battery turrets were almost submerged. Finally, the Bismarck capsized and sank at 1039 in the approximate position of 48º 10' North, 16º 12' West.

Almost two hours had elapsed since the battle had begun, and the Bismarck had shown a formidable capacity of resistance. The British first struck Bismarck at 0902, and ceased fire around 1016. For 74 minutes, the Bismarck received a continuous hammering that no other warship could have taken. We need not forget that the Hood sank six minutes after the first German shells were fired only three days earlier. Moreover, neither the main belt nor the armour deck were seen to be penetrated during the combat, and in the end it was her own crew who scuttled the ship. During this last engagement 2,876 shells were fired at the Bismarck. They are itemised as follows:

380 of 40.6 cm from Rodney
339 of 35.6 cm from King George V
527 of 20.3 cm from Norfolk
254 of 20.3 cm from Dorsetshire
716 of 15.2 cm from Rodney
660 of 13.3 cm from King George V

It will never be known how many of them did actually hit (400, 500, 600, maybe more), but taking into account the short distances in the last phase of the combat, it is assumed that many shells hit.

At 1100, only 20 minutes after the sinking, Winston Churchill informed the House of Commons gathered at Church House about the operations against Bismarck: "This morning shortly after day-break, the Bismarck virtually immobilized, without help, was attacked by British battleships that pursued her. I don't know the result of this action. It seems however, that Bismarck was not sunk by gunfire, and now will be sunk by torpedoes. It is believed that this is happening right now. Great as is our loss in the Hood, the Bismarck must be regarded as the most powerful enemy battleship, as she is the newest enemy battleship and the striking of her from the German Navy is a very definite simplification of the task of maintaining effective mastery of the Northern sea and maintenance of the Northern blockade." Mr. Churchill had just sat down when he was given a note, the Prime Minister rose again and said: "I have just received news that the Bismarck is sunk." The cheers were loud and long.

Survivors

Around 800 sailors managed to abandon the Bismarck before she sank. The rest of the crew, many of them still alive sank with the battleship. An hour later, the Dorsetshire picked up 86 sailors and the Maori another 25. The temperature of the water was 13º C. The British did not recover more men because they claimed there were U-boats in the area. Hours later, the U-74 (Lieutenant Eitel-Friedrich Kentrat) rescued three more sailors. They were Herbert Manthey, Otto Höntzsch, and Georg Herzog. The next day (28th), the German weather observation ship Sachsenwald (Lieutenant Wilhelm Schütte) found two more, Otto Maus and Walter Lorenzen. Meanwhile, the Spanish heavy cruiser Canarias (Captain Benigno González-Aller) had left the port of El Ferrol at 1140 on 27 May in an attempt to rescue some survivors from the Bismarck. On 30 May, after a brief meeting with the Sachsenwald the Canarias found two dead bodies floating in the sea which were pulled aboard. These were Walter Grasczak and Heinrich Neuschwander. At 1000 on the next day (31st), they were given a naval burial service and their bodies were committed to the deep. In the end, out of a crew of more than 2,200 officers, non-commissioned officers and men only 115 survived.

Following the sinking of the Bismarck, German aircraft had been sent to look for Admiral Tovey’s force that had run low on fuel and was on its way back home. On 28 May, the destroyers Tartar and Mashona were attacked by German bombers. Mashona was hit by a bomb on her port side and sank with the loss of 46 men. The Tartar rescued about 170 men, including Mashona’s commander William H. Selby. The rest of the British fleet arrived safely in port.



Operation Rheinübung: Final Observations.


Although considered a fine commander, Admiral Lütjens has been unjustly criticised for some of the decisions made during Operation Rheinübung. Today with the advantage of knowing the final outcome of battle, it is easy to conduct a deep examination of the operations and say what Lütjens should or shouldn't have done. But one must put oneself in the German Admiral’s place and try to understand the difficulties that affected his decisions and the time and circunmstances in which they were made. Nevertheless, the truth is that both German and British committed a series of "reproachable mistakes" that made this story even more dramatic and interesting. If a single one of those mistakes had not been made, the course of the operations could have developed in a completely different way and the outcome of the battle could have been quite different. As Karel Stepanek playing Admiral Lütjens in the 1960 movie "Sink the Bismarck" says: "We have a most interesting chess game here".

From the operative point of view, Operation Rheinübung was a failure since its first stages, since as early as 20 May, the German battle group had been already detected in the Kattegat. The British demonstrated that they had heavily improved their vigilance, and successfully signalled Bismarck's movements from her first arrival in Norwegian waters. The Germans, on the other hand, suffered from inadequate military intelligence and a lack of effective cooperation with the U-boat arm. Despite all this, the Bismarck almost escaped, and she would certainly have done so, if it were not for that fatal torpedo hit on the stern. If there is one thing that can not be reproached is the conduct of her crew which was in every way exemplary.

For the German Navy the sinking of the battleship Bismarck was probably the heaviest single blow of the war. Nevertheless, the Kriegsmarine still had considerable striking power and was far from being defeated as the year 1942 proved; however, but the loss of the Bismarck marked a turning point in the war on Allied merchant shipping. Not only because of the loss of the battleship itself, but because the consequences that it brought. Shortly after Operation Rheinübung, the Germans abandoned the use of heavy surface warships for raiding purposes in the Atlantic. From then on, only the auxiliary cruisers remained engaged against enemy merchant shipping, but even their use proved difficult by the end of 1941, and therefore the Germans concentrated their efforts in the U-boat war. U-boats would still bring important successes, but they, too, were eventually defeated in May 1943 with the loss of 41 units, in what it can be considered as the other turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The aircraft carrier had revealed itself as a decisive weapon and soon was to replace the battleship as the ultimate warship. This was confirmed six months later during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, and during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first true aero-naval battle in history between two carrier forces. Today, now in the 21st century, the battleship era is long gone, but the story of the Bismarck and her brave crew still fascinates thousands of people and her legend is still very much alive.

"Ship unable to manoeuvre. We will fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer".

Admiral Lütjens was a good and faithfull Soldier!

After Capt. Lindemann gave orders to scuttle the ship and permitted the crew to abandon it, he decided he will go down with the Bismarck. A surviving sailor remembers, how he was standing on his post, facing the Flag at the Heck and saluting. An Officer tried to pull him on his arm and off the ship, but he pulled himself loose and clutched to the reiling, desperatly trying to avoid being town away or washed off by the waves.
there is also the heroic story of the ships-surgeon (forgott his name), who stayed with the wounded and went down with the ship. So they didn't have to suffer, he gave them an overdosis of morphine, so they would silently pass away in their sleep. He then sat between them, and geve the final injection to himself.

Other sailors report, that when the ship capsized, some survivors managed to climb up on the rump. they stood near the rudders at the heck, saluted with the "german greeting" and sang the national anthem "Deutschland über Alles".

This is true greatness. It is true Germaness in it's best teutonic tradition. Our fallen heros are the most precious thing we have. I will forever love them and admire their spirit and sacrefice.

Antiohos,
A very good full and complete account of Rheinburg. Thank you.

German standing orders forbid a cruiser to enter an action with a battleship , when action was joined in Denmark Strait , Prinz Eugen as you say was in the lead and Holland opened fire on her in error .
Captain Leach in Prince of Wales did not make this mistake.
Holland made good use of his resources and almost got it spot on , he observed a strict radio silence so his arrival came as a surprise to Lutjens.
His effort to close the range quickly only allowed him use of his forward turrets and he was in the early stages of making his turn to open his arcs when the fatal shots straddled and hit him.
Commanders Schnieders gunnery was excellent and he fully deserved his award of the Knights Cross.
It is a piece of common ground Bismarck almost shared with Hood , in that Prince of Wales was far from ready for battle she had a crew which was not fully run in , the ship was new and had major problems with her main guns , shipyard workers sailed with her, poor buggers had no choice !

Erich Topp begged that Tirpitz be allowed to go as well , he felt confident that she was ready and he so wanted to accompany Bismarck.
Had she been there both British units would have been sunk , that's almost certain.

Lutjens was under orders not to engage capital ships and when Hood and Prince of Wales arrived he was slightly stunned.
Lindemann asked for permission to open fire , Lujens did not reply.
Lindemann was heard to mutter " I am dammed if I am going to have my ship shot from under my arse" . Lutjens then ordered that fire be returned.

Lutjens major mistake was the long radio signal , he thought the cruisers were still in touch , he almost got away with it when the british forces used the rwong charts to plot an intecept and for several hours steamed on the wrong course.

The two Catalinas from Lough Erne. Most of 240 and 209 Squadrons aircraft had been sent to Iceland to search for the German units .
( One catalins from 240 squadron saw the Hood and Prince of wales prior to the action and heard the rumble of the guns, a 201 Sunderland saw the Hood go up and overflew the wreckage.
Briggs and the 240 squadron pilot who also found Bismarck ( Gaynor Williams) thought they had little hope of being in on it , fate would dictate otherwise and for a time following the contact the 240 Cat. shadowed Bismarck.
I know one of the gents who was on her , his line is that he is the only man alive to have prepared a steak dinner for 8 men whilst being taken under fire by a german battleship. This must surely be the truth !!
Briggs Catalina did not surive long afterwards.
She was transferred to 302 FTU and in May 42 she left Lough Erne and failed to return.

The Britsh shell fire that sank Bismarck it lacked the power and penetration of the plunging fire of a battle fought at long range .
The flat trajectory short range could not penetrate the heavy armour but it destroyed her upper works and turned above decks into a total ruin.
The hit by Ark Royal , was luck , pure luck another few hours and she would have been safe , if the attack had failed she would have been under air cover the next day and the british ship in any case would not have had the fuel to continue .

A few years ago I was on Clare Island on Ireland's West Coast , and found just outside the local cemetery a neglected Commonwealth headstone to a sailor from Mashona , which was sunk by german aircraft as she steamed home from the Bismarck chase.

The poor man ( a petty officer) had drifted to Ireland and was recovered by local fishermen and buried just outside the local catholic cemetery. he was not buried within as no-one knew if he was catholic.
( The fishermen saw gulls gathering around something in the water and they went to investigate and found the decaying body of the sailor.).
Recently the local people had the ground he is buried in blessed and the wall of the cemetery was moved to bring this poor man in from the cold.

Dr Brandt is correct when he mentions that Lindeman would not leave the ship.
Dorsetshire was ordered to leave as a result of a possible U-boat sighting with many German sailors still in the water , something which the British did not want to do but had to do .
A naval rating who was helping bring aboard the surivors let himself down to the water as his ship was gathering speed to help on board a german sailor who was almost out of strength , he got the German aboard only to find himself on a charge for disobeying orders.
I say well done that man , for disobeying.

Dr. Brandt may not like me for pointing this out , Lutjens came from a Jewish family , his grandfather was Jewish and his brother had left Germany to live in Switzerland. Lutjens refused to go saying he was a German naval officer and he had a duty to the Navy.
In the Kreigsmarine things like this were possible.

Certainly one of the most amazing sea chases of any time.
If anyone can see the 1970's BBC documentery by Ludovic Kennedy
" Battleship Bismarck" , Kennedy's father was Captain of the Armed Merchant cruiser " Rawalpindi" which was sunk by Scharnhorst in 1941 , Kennedy himself was a Lt. on HMS Tartar one of the destroyers chasing Bismarck.
The acount of her being sighted by a young naval rating from Prince of wales and the account of the openning shots are quite unique.

The recent footage from the Ocean floor of both Hood and Bismarck echo the violence of their encounter and the destruction wrought on Hood and Bismarck.
May all the men who lie there do so in peace.

Some good reading if anyone is interested.
" Battleship Bismarck -A Surivors Story" by Burkrad Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg.
"The Loss of Bismarck- An Avoidable Disaster" Graham Rhys-Jones.
"The Bismarck Chase - new light on a famous engagement" by Robert J. Winklareth.
"Pursuit" By Ludovic Kennedy.
is Bismarck of interest to me , yes, as I look above me 2 x Robert Taylor Prints of her. One as she engages Hood in the Denmark strait , the other of her being located by Briggs Lough Erne based Catalina.