Perun
07-23-2004, 04:56 PM
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RMSMC/message/3819
Reagan won the Cold War all by himself? It's a myth
By Daniel Sneider
Mercury News
Jun 14, 2004
As a reporter in Moscow, I had the privilege of witnessing one of the great events of the past century - the end of Soviet communism and the collapse of the Soviet empire.
What I saw and heard bears almost no resemblance to the pernicious myth repeated in recent days that Ronald Reagan single-handedly won the Cold War.
The myth distorts history. It insults the Polish dockworkers, Lithuanian nationalists and Russian democrats who risked their lives for freedom. If any single person can be credited for such a momentous event, it would be Mikhail Gorbachev.
Even worse, the myth perpetuates a dangerous idea, now at play in the deserts of Iraq, that the United States can, by its own will, transform other societies.
To his credit, Ronald Reagan didn't create this myth - his supporters did. They claim the decision to pursue the "star wars" program, along with a massive defense buildup, drove the Soviet Union to economic collapse. And they insist that Reagan's calls for freedom inspired the uprising against Communist rule.
There is a kernel of truth to this. The United States had to make clear to the Soviet leadership that it could not advance its aims by military means or ever hope to win an arms race. And it needed to not lose sight of the fact that the Cold War was also a struggle of ideas.
Those principles did not belong exclusively, however, to Reagan. They are the core of the doctrine of containment crafted at the dawn of the Cold War by diplomat George Kennan. As long as the West remained unified and strong, Kennan predicted, the Soviet system would eventually collapse from its own inherent limitations.
That "long twilight struggle" succeeded. The Soviet Union I encountered at the end of the 1980s was exhausted. Soviet workers were soaked in vodka by midday. Dimly lit grocery stores were lined with bottles of pickled tomatoes nobody would buy. In Soviet offices, a desk covered with large clunky rotary dial phones was a sign of power. To me it was evidence of a country left behind by the microchip revolution.
Though it commanded tremendous resources, the Soviet military wasn't much more impressive. On the bases of elite Soviet Marines and advanced jet fighter wings, the men paid more attention to cultivating potato fields they depended on for food. Even some Russians described their own country as "Bangladesh with nuclear weapons."
The crisis of legitimacy was kept in check only by the fading fear of the police state. Russians read official propaganda in reverse - whatever the authorities said was white, they knew had to be black.
Cynicism was the dominant ideology of the Communist Party. No one mentioned Marx or talked of socialism. A failed coup in 1991 was carried out by drunken apparatchiks desperate to hang on to power, pale remnants of the ruthless Bolsheviks who created this system.
Nationalism was and remains the most powerful motivating belief. Russians still felt pride in their nation and hoped freedom would bring them prosperity as part of Europe. From Poland to Armenia, entire populations revolted against Russian imperial rule. The depth of disaffection was a shock not only to Gorbachev but also to the American leadership, which never saw the breakup of the Soviet Union coming.
The Soviet system was already in crisis by the 1960s. The expose of Stalin's crimes had dug deep into belief. The growth symbolized by massive projects, many of them built with slave labor, had reached its limit. An attempt at limited economic reform failed.
The Soviet Union probably lived longer than it properly should have for two reasons - the Vietnam War, which discredited and fatigued the United States; and the OPEC oil cartel, which allowed the Soviets to paper over their problems with booming revenue from oil and gas exports (which continues to this day).
Gorbachev sought reform not to keep up with America but to save the system. But each step to open up the Soviet Union only exposed its weakness, most of all to its own people. Ultimately his reforms only hastened the end.
To the extent that Ronald Reagan recognized the potential of these changes and encouraged them, he helped speed the end of the Cold War. But it is time to dump the self-congratulatory rhetoric into the dustbin of history where communism now resides.
Reagan won the Cold War all by himself? It's a myth
By Daniel Sneider
Mercury News
Jun 14, 2004
As a reporter in Moscow, I had the privilege of witnessing one of the great events of the past century - the end of Soviet communism and the collapse of the Soviet empire.
What I saw and heard bears almost no resemblance to the pernicious myth repeated in recent days that Ronald Reagan single-handedly won the Cold War.
The myth distorts history. It insults the Polish dockworkers, Lithuanian nationalists and Russian democrats who risked their lives for freedom. If any single person can be credited for such a momentous event, it would be Mikhail Gorbachev.
Even worse, the myth perpetuates a dangerous idea, now at play in the deserts of Iraq, that the United States can, by its own will, transform other societies.
To his credit, Ronald Reagan didn't create this myth - his supporters did. They claim the decision to pursue the "star wars" program, along with a massive defense buildup, drove the Soviet Union to economic collapse. And they insist that Reagan's calls for freedom inspired the uprising against Communist rule.
There is a kernel of truth to this. The United States had to make clear to the Soviet leadership that it could not advance its aims by military means or ever hope to win an arms race. And it needed to not lose sight of the fact that the Cold War was also a struggle of ideas.
Those principles did not belong exclusively, however, to Reagan. They are the core of the doctrine of containment crafted at the dawn of the Cold War by diplomat George Kennan. As long as the West remained unified and strong, Kennan predicted, the Soviet system would eventually collapse from its own inherent limitations.
That "long twilight struggle" succeeded. The Soviet Union I encountered at the end of the 1980s was exhausted. Soviet workers were soaked in vodka by midday. Dimly lit grocery stores were lined with bottles of pickled tomatoes nobody would buy. In Soviet offices, a desk covered with large clunky rotary dial phones was a sign of power. To me it was evidence of a country left behind by the microchip revolution.
Though it commanded tremendous resources, the Soviet military wasn't much more impressive. On the bases of elite Soviet Marines and advanced jet fighter wings, the men paid more attention to cultivating potato fields they depended on for food. Even some Russians described their own country as "Bangladesh with nuclear weapons."
The crisis of legitimacy was kept in check only by the fading fear of the police state. Russians read official propaganda in reverse - whatever the authorities said was white, they knew had to be black.
Cynicism was the dominant ideology of the Communist Party. No one mentioned Marx or talked of socialism. A failed coup in 1991 was carried out by drunken apparatchiks desperate to hang on to power, pale remnants of the ruthless Bolsheviks who created this system.
Nationalism was and remains the most powerful motivating belief. Russians still felt pride in their nation and hoped freedom would bring them prosperity as part of Europe. From Poland to Armenia, entire populations revolted against Russian imperial rule. The depth of disaffection was a shock not only to Gorbachev but also to the American leadership, which never saw the breakup of the Soviet Union coming.
The Soviet system was already in crisis by the 1960s. The expose of Stalin's crimes had dug deep into belief. The growth symbolized by massive projects, many of them built with slave labor, had reached its limit. An attempt at limited economic reform failed.
The Soviet Union probably lived longer than it properly should have for two reasons - the Vietnam War, which discredited and fatigued the United States; and the OPEC oil cartel, which allowed the Soviets to paper over their problems with booming revenue from oil and gas exports (which continues to this day).
Gorbachev sought reform not to keep up with America but to save the system. But each step to open up the Soviet Union only exposed its weakness, most of all to its own people. Ultimately his reforms only hastened the end.
To the extent that Ronald Reagan recognized the potential of these changes and encouraged them, he helped speed the end of the Cold War. But it is time to dump the self-congratulatory rhetoric into the dustbin of history where communism now resides.